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ABSTRACT 
 
Thus Mangle Ye Still the Human Race: 
A Study in Structural Navigation.  (May 2006) 
B. Garrick Harden, B.A., Augusta State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Stjepan Mestrovic 
 
 
This thesis places three sociological figures in discourse with one another:  
Ferdinand Tönnies, Emile Durkheim and Friedrich Nietzsche.  I argue, within the 
contexts of the three theorists’ philosophies, that contemporary society is 
problematic due to its many artifices enslaving individuals.  The effects of these 
artifices are devastating on individuals living in contemporary society as they 
become encased in simulacra realities reified by engrained beliefs such as 
socially defined “individuality.”  I then propose that one possible method of 
creating individual freedom in contemporary society may be in the establishment 
of communities based upon deep friendships and trust. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ill-omened spectres, ye!  Thus mangle ye still 
The human race on thousands of occasions; 
Indifferent days themselves entangle ye still 
In a vile web of mingled tribulations. 
It’s hard, I know, from spirits to get free; 
The strenuous spirit-tie we cannot sever. 
Still, Worry, though it great and stealthy be, 
Thy power I shall not acknowledge ever. 
---------Goethe’s Faust 
 
I cover a great deal of ground in this thesis.  On the one hand I have 
attempted to convey a perspective of contemporary society and individuals living 
in and with it that illustrates a need for change; on the other, I have tried to find a 
possible way of existing in contemporary society that would celebrate the dignity 
and humanity of individuals.  I have dealt with this topic in three chapters:  
society, individuals and communities.  
In the first chapter, I introduce the “problems” with contemporary society 
as I see them.  In concert with Ferdinand Tönnies, Emile Durkheim and Friedrich 
Nietzsche I argue that contemporary society is dehumanizing and oppressive on 
many levels.  Economically, structurally and culturally we are constrained by a 
will much more powerful than our own—the collective.  We are born into it, 
raised in it and by the time we have come to a point where we can question it, we 
                                                 
  This thesis follows the style of Sociological Theory. 
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are too dependent upon it to adequately so do.  We become so enmeshed in the 
collective that an attack on it is an attack on ourselves.  We cannot strike out 
alone for we would be unable to survive and besides, with the specter of 
globalization, where is there to go?  This creates a situation where one can 
complacently submit to the dehumanization of society or take positive action 
within it.  This chapter is the foundational piece from which the last two chapters 
come.  As such, its topic is dealt with the most extensively while the last two, for 
the sake of space, are much shorter, exploratory forays into topics deserving, in 
my mind, much further analysis. 
After I describe the “problems” of contemporary society, I describe what 
individuals enmeshed in the collective of the day have become.  The second 
chapter on individuals deals in a more direct way than chapter one with the 
illusion and possible realization of individuality in contemporary society.  I 
discuss models of individuality that deal with the question of the “nature” of 
humans such as Durkheim’s assertion that individuals need to be controlled in 
order to restrain our insatiable desires; I also look at models of individuality that 
argue our nature is constructed by the societies we live in and that individuality is 
either a tool or something to be embraced depending on the nature we are given 
by society; I also look at ideal typifications of individuality such as Nietzsche’s 
hierarchy of human nature leading up to the birth of the “overman” and the 
subsequent deconstruction of society.  Ultimately I agree that individuality is 
socially constructed so we are, in a sense, predetermined by the societies we are 
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raised in; however, that determinacy does not preclude any agency and once we 
have become self aware, we are capable of making changes within the bounds in 
which we are kept. 
In the final chapter I discuss past models of communities and how these 
can never exist again after the advent of contemporary society but they can 
provide alternative models through which creative people can play—making 
something entirely new with the remnants of the old.  Community construction is 
offered as one way we may be able to transcend the oppression and 
dehumanization of contemporary society while still living within it.  I discuss 
many different models of communities that have sprung up in contemporary 
society to meet the needs for human connection within an alienating society and 
then analyze the different reasons why what I am proposing is a model entirely 
different from these communities.  I argue communities that spontaneous spring 
up in an advanced organic society can be no more than simulacra connections 
based upon varying transitory societal problems whereas I propose a more solid 
model for consideration. 
Someone recently challenged me to explain why I chose this topic for my 
thesis among a plethora of other possible topics; I was unable to answer.  I was 
not unable to answer because I did not know why but because I had not yet faced 
why.  I could prattle on about abstract concepts but I was not ready to make this 
thesis personal; I merely wanted to think this thesis not to feel it.  I viscerally 
realized why I wanted to write this thesis one night while I spoke with a friend 
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about what he planned to do after he finished school and the reason came to me 
real and personal in its simplicity:  I do not like this model for society; nor do I 
do want to reify it; but I see no way out of it.  I did not want to admit this to 
myself because to do so would be to also admit I had no answer for it.  If you do 
not like a relationship you are in for one reason or another (let alone because the 
relationship is enslaving) you can leave it.  But what is there to do if 
contemporary society is enslaving?   Nothing?  Could I accept that possibility?  It 
is impossible to leave this society because there is no where in the world left to 
go.  There is really no alternative model left so that any attempts to leave would 
necessarily be a perpetual “running from” and never a “running to.”  What kind 
of life is a perpetual “running from?”  Not much of one it seems to me.   
Nietzsche tells a story in The Gay Science that a man was once walking 
along a path when he stumbled upon something.  He was not certain what it was 
so, out of curiosity, he bent and picked it up in order to examine it.  He quickly 
realized he held a new truth in his hands and quickly dropped it as though 
burned.  The man ran away saying, “I do not want to see anything that 
contradicts the prevalent opinion.  Am I called upon to discover new truths?  
There are too many old ones, as it is…” (25).1  I am writing this thesis because I 
do not want to be that man.  It is too early and I am too young (perhaps still too 
naïve and idealistic) to simply become complacent and yet I have no alternative 
                                                 
1 For clarification on format, throughout this thesis I will cite Nietzsche’s writings according to the 
aphorism number instead of page number in keeping with the usual format used when dealing with 
Nietzsche. 
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model.  I suppose I am not really looking for an answer so much as possibilities.  
This thesis is about two things for me:  I am clarifying that there is a problem and 
what that problem is and then I am trying to present one idea to get around that 
problem.  Some whose ideas have influenced me through the years have 
projected the answer into the future and an eventual solution that we are 
inexorably heading towards.  For Marx, the solution was revolutions in the 
modes of production until we reached communism; for Nietzsche, it was the 
coming of the savior-figure of the Overman.  Though these hopes for rosy futures 
may allow some to sleep soundly at night they are stagnating concepts.  If we 
believe a solution is coming regardless of what we do or do not do then we are 
placing everything in hope and not action.  I believe if any solutions are to be 
created (and I am not willing to accept the nihilism propounded by some 
postmodern theorists), we are who must create them.  We cannot project our 
perceived problems into the future and tell ourselves “one day;” if anything is 
going to change it must start today and we must start it whether our possible 
solutions are small (as in the possibility I explore in this thesis) or grandiose—at 
least we will have tried.  And that is why I chose this topic. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
SOCIETY 
 
This chapter briefly describes three different explanations for how society 
became what it is today according to Tönnies, Durkheim and Nietzsche.  All 
three provide a story of how we came to contemporary society and the stories are 
instrumental in introducing the different ways each theorist sees the modern 
world as each tells a different story.  Though each of these thinkers has a 
different way of seeing the social world, I contend that each help, in concert with 
one another, to understand a three-dimensional picture.  Each theorist has their 
own version of a social will that emanates out of the wills of individuals 
comprising society but each sees that will doing different things.  I argue that the 
social will can be seen as a kind of alien sovereign that maintains an authoritative 
grip upon the lives of individuals who are helping reify the very structure 
oppressing them.  Finally, I argue that society comes with a set of valuations we, 
as both creators of and slaves to the social will, project onto it.  Tönnies, 
Durkheim and Nietzsche are placed in conversation with one another about the 
values of society.  Unfortunately, this topic is not one that can have a tidy 
conclusion and in the end of this chapter, more description than proof, I discuss 
the possible methods of addressing the problem of social oppression the three 
theorists propose. 
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BIRTHS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES 
Tönnies defines his concept of contemporary society (Gesellschaft) in 
largely economic terms.  A great deal of Tönnies’ analysis of Gesellschaft is 
reliant upon Karl Marx’s analysis; so much so that Tönnies wrote an addendum 
in 1911 after his analysis of gesellschaft stating, “[w]hen this treatise was written 
(1880-1887), the completion of the Marxian system which has, among others, 
influenced its contents, was not yet made known” (Tönnies, 2002, 101).  I make 
this note at the beginning of my discussion of Tönnies’ Gesellschaft for readers 
familiar with Marx’s writings but not Tönnies’ so as to avoid confusion as 
Marx’s concepts are used in this thesis only where Tönnies has appropriated 
them. 
Tönnies argues that there was a gradual, yet distinct, shift in human social 
relations from Gemeinschaft (the German word for community, which definition 
Tönnies alters to mean community in the sense of simpler societies)2 to 
Gesellschaft.  The evolution of Gemeinschaft into Gesellschaft can also be 
expressed as a shift from organic to mechanical formations.  Tönnies refers to 
Gemeinschaft as being ‘organic’ because he sees it as a quasi-utopian state of 
nature, which operations are akin to intuition and dialectic interpretation, where 
social unity is based on customs, folkways and deep felt sentiments for fellow 
Gemeinschaft members; Tönnies writes, “everything real is organic” (Ibid., 35).  
In contradistinction, Gesellschaft is referred to as ‘mechanical’ because Tönnies 
                                                 
2 I discuss this in much greater detail in Chapter III. 
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sees it as being artificial fictions operating under logic and rationality that reduce 
the living to the dead (Ibid., 36).  A fundamental part of this social evolution was 
the gradual intensification of individuals’ specialization in varying parts of 
production or, in other words, the creation and development of the division of 
labor. 
 Tönnies paints a bleak picture of Gesellschaft where people live in a 
society in which they are dominated by artificial constructions such as credit and 
debt as well as reduced to mere commodities.  Gesellschaft is marked by people 
existing together en masse without any deep “human” bonds:   
[I]n the Gesellschaft they [humans] are essentially 
separated in spite of all uniting factors.  In the Gesellschaft, as 
contrasted with the Gemeinschaft, we find no actions that can be 
derived from an a priori and necessarily existing unity; no actions, 
therefore which manifest the will and the spirit of the unity even if 
performed by the individual; no actions which, in so far as they are 
performed by the individual, take place on behalf of those united 
with him.  In the Gesellschaft such actions do not exist.  On the 
contrary, here everybody is by himself and isolated, and there 
exists a condition of tension against all others.  Their spheres of 
activity and power are sharply separated, so that everybody refuses 
to everyone else contact with and admittance to his sphere; i. e., 
intrusions are regarded as hostile acts.  Such a negative attitude 
toward one another becomes the normal and always underlying 
relation of these power endowed individuals, and it characterizes 
the Gesellschaft in the condition of the rest; nobody wants to grant 
and produce anything for another individual, nor will he be 
inclined to give ungrudgingly to another individual, if it be not in 
exchange for a gift or labor equivalent that he considers at least 
equal to what he has given.  It is even necessary that it be more 
desirable to him than what he could have kept himself; because he 
will be moved to give away a good only for the sake of receiving 
something that seems better to him (Ibid., 65).  
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Thus, the unity in Gesellschaft is a divisive one where people exist in a collective 
that requires a shift in perspective from seeing fellows as ends in and of 
themselves to seeing them as means to economic ends.  This creates a situation 
where people are not fellows with one another but as means to ends they are 
material objects.  Material objects then stand outside the individual as something 
separate and other.  By example, a carpenter may define him/herself as such 
through the creative act of manipulating wood into something that was not there 
before but a tool, such as a saw, stands outside the self-definition of “carpenter” 
as something secondary and “not-self.”  In Gesellschaft, it is much the same 
where other individuals exist as secondary to one another and do not enter into 
the self-definition of “human.”  There are many other important points in the 
above general description of Gesellschaft that Tönnies only implies here such as 
the division of labor (“Their spheres of activity and power are sharply 
separated”) and the coercive and corrosive positions people take in relation to 
others (“he will…give away a good only for…something that seems better”). 
According to Tönnies, the division of labor into specialized camps is one 
of the defining characteristics of Gesellschaft.  To explain the existence of the 
division of labor, Tönnies describes several smaller shifts that had to occur.  
Understanding Tönnies interpretation of the division of labor requires the 
timeline he creates.  The question of historical precision is not as important as 
how the story Tönnies tells of the emergence of the division of labor helps in his 
analysis of the social phenomenon.  The advent of Gesellschaft, and thus the 
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division of labor, required the commodification of material creations, which, 
under Gemeinschaft would be, according to Tönnies, held in common by 
members of the Gemeinschaft for the value perceived according to the uses of 
materials.  Gemeinschaft did not evolve into Gesellschaft overnight though; it 
was a long process.   
Tönnies argues that Gemeinschafts came in contact with one another and 
could react in varying ways when this occurred; one of which being trade under a 
bartering system of product for product from which material creations took on 
the value of being potentially tradable (in other words the products became 
potential commodities).   Trade leads to a situation of dependence between 
groups of manufacturers each group of which having its own desires and needs.  
This situation was one of limited competition and led to the need of a “universal” 
commodity that could be used in lieu of other commodities, i.e.:  money (Ibid., 
69-70).  Ironically, money began as a means to an end (the consumption of more 
commodities) but the subsequent increase in trade between groups of people 
eventually led to professional traders or merchants.  According to Tönnies, 
merchants stand in an interesting relationship with Gesellschaft and he makes a 
distinction between them and capitalists.  Capitalists, he wrote, accumulate 
money in order to consume more commodities whereas merchants accumulate 
money for the sake of money.  Thus money, at least for merchants, became an 
end in and of itself (Ibid., 87). 
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In Europe, this major shift would have begun gaining momentum in the 
Medieval Era with the advent of towns and it went through three general phases 
to bring about Gesellschaft as it stood when Tönnies was writing:  “(1) simple 
co-operation [such as production in Gemeinschaft], (2) manufacture [such as 
with the medieval guilds], (3) industry based on machinery [contemporary 
factories]” (Ibid., 89).  The guild division between master craftsman and 
journeyman can be seen as a proto-division of labor with one major difference:  
the pedagogical reasons for the division in this case.  Master craftsmen would 
benefit from the labor of journeymen but the two groups worked together on 
projects and the journeymen would work towards attaining the level of master 
craftsmen under the tutelage of the guild.  During this period of tutelage, the 
journeyman would learn the entire process of production; however, Tönnies 
argues, with increases in technology, the knowledge of production was divided 
among laborers making production more efficient and more profitable (Ibid.). 
Durkheim, like Tönnies, drew a distinction between mechanical and 
organic forms of society.  For Durkheim, however, the difference ran in the 
opposite direction.  Simpler societies were labeled “mechanical,” not because 
they were seen as artificial, but because Durkheim saw in them an “analogy with 
the cohesion that links together the elements of raw materials…” (Durkheim, 
1997, 84).  Individuals form a unity in these simpler societies they are just alike.  
The very term “simpler societies” points to Durkheim’s reasoning:  organic 
beings are complex.  Thus, contemporary society was labeled “organic.”  
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Organic societies for Durkheim, just as Gesellschaft for Tönnies, are defined by 
their high degree of labor division.  Durkheim likens the division of labor to the 
division of organs in an animal; “Each part of the animal, once it has become an 
organ, has its own sphere of action, in which in moves independently…” (Ibid., 
140) yet operates together in order to form the whole complex structure.  At its 
most basic, the difference between mechanical and organic societies is a question 
of similarity between individuals:  “The more primitive societies are, the more 
resemblances there are between the individuals….  By contrast, among civilized 
people two individuals can be distinguished from one another at a first glance…” 
(Ibid., 88-89).   
Unlike Tönnies, Durkheim does not have a long story to explain the 
existence of the division of labor; he argues it has always existed, in one form or 
another, in human societies; in mechanical societies, he argued, the division of 
labor was represented by division between gender.  The question Durkheim 
asked was not how did it come to be but how did it come to be so complex.  He 
contends that the division of labor can be understood in evolutionary terms.  In 
mechanical societies, it is analogous to colonies of microscopic organisms; as 
mechanical society into organic, colonies group together and come to depend 
upon one another for survival thus developing specialized functions.  The 
“segmentary type” of society, metaphorically represented by microscopic 
colonies, is so interconnected that individual movements of the parts necessarily 
affect the whole in visible ways.  The segments of homogenous mechanical 
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society, however, progresses toward greater autonomy and provides the 
framework for later organs.  This social evolution, much like its counterpart in 
biology, is “natural” according to Durkheim and as such follows a “natural” path 
from simplicity to complexity characterized by the perpetual assimilation of 
segments into organized society (though Durkheim wrote there are occasional 
exceptions where segments are not assimilated which is analogous to humans 
still possessing wisdom teeth).  By “natural” path, he is not, like the poet 
Alexander Pope, tautologically claiming “whatever is, is right,” because, as will 
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, individual humans are not 
strictly analogous to individual cells in an organism as humans have wills of their 
own.  Organic society can take on “pathological forms,” such as anomie, that 
deteriorate social solidarity (Ibid.). 
Organic societies are complex and require an ordering system to respond 
to such complexity much like complex biological organisms need a nervous 
system.  In mechanical societies, religion permeated all aspects of social life and 
as religion is repressive, the imposed order (laws) coming from religion is 
repressive.  Repressive laws in organic societies retain the element of 
“passionate” (Ibid., 52) retribution from mechanical societies but also serve more 
directly as a reification of the moral code for others.  In other words, if someone 
commits a murder and is subsequently killed by a state, the act of killing serves 
not only to punish the moral offender but also to inject into the populace a fear of 
committing murder.  Due to the differences between individuals in an organic 
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society, laws that create and maintain certain individual “rights” (such as life, 
property and the pursuit of happiness) are required.  Durkheim calls these laws 
“restitutory.”  Restitutory laws, to a large extent, provide negative solidarity or 
bonds between people and material objects.  The existence of negative solidarity, 
however, first requires the existence of positive solidarity, or bonds between 
people, so that individuals will recognize others as having rights (colloquially:  
“your rights end where my nose begins”).  As such, violation of restitutory laws 
does end in punishment in the form of revoking rights but as a forced repair of 
damaged social bonds.  The difference between repressive and restitutory laws 
can is demonstrated by the Occident’s judicial systems distinguishing between 
criminal and civil court (Ibid.). 
Laws are not the only social artifacts that produce solidarity; the division 
of labor is created by a kind of positive solidarity within society Durkheim calls 
“organic solidarity” (Ibid., 85).  This assertion by Durkheim directly contradicts 
thinkers such as Tönnies who maintain the division of labor is, as its label 
implies, divisive.  The unity producing the division of labor is sui generis3 and as 
such is peculiar to organic society.  As Durkheim describes organic solidarity, it 
is: 
on the one hand each one of us depends more intimately 
upon society the more labour is divided up, and on the other, the 
activity of each one of us is correspondingly more specialized, the 
more personal it is.  Doubtless, however circumscribed that 
activity may be, it is completely original.  Even in the exercise of 
our profession we conform to usages and practices that are 
                                                 
3 Latin:  “of its own kind” 
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common to us all within our corporation.  Yet even in this case, the 
burden that we bear is in a different way less heavy than when the 
whole of society bears down upon us, and this leaves much more 
room for the free play of our initiative (Ibid.). 
 
Organic solidarity is multi-faceted.  The increasing separation of labor into 
specialized facets requires each individual to depend increasingly upon society.  
For example, consider a person born and raised in a city like New York; he/she 
probably does not know how to kill and prepare the meat of cattle but then there 
are ranchers and butchers who do the job and in turn depend upon farmers and 
grocers for grains and vegetables, etc.  The simple example illustrates the unity 
based upon dependence from which the division of labor arises.  Organic 
solidarity also provides us with common “usages and practices” that save us from 
having to perpetually create new methods to accomplish tasks.  We are able to 
have freedom and creative expression through the circumscription of activities 
produced by this unity because we do not have to concern ourselves with all the 
aspects of life only the portion in which we specialize.  Furthermore, our 
professions are personal:  a carpenter self-defines as such.  Our specialization 
becomes a part of who we are; in organic society, it is an integral part of self-
concepts as persons.  Therefore, according to Durkheim, organic society and the 
division of labor are unifying and “natural” conditions of humanity. 
Nietzsche also argues there has been a distinct shift between previous and 
contemporary societies but, unlike Tönnies and Durkheim, he locates the origin 
shift in primarily cultural terms.  He begins his discussion, in On the Genealogy 
of Morals (1989), with an etymological analysis of words used to describe moral 
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sensibilities.  Nietzsche claims the creation of language is an act of power and as 
such, words are created by the powerful and (presumably) “high-stationed” (2).  
Etymology can then provide insight into the origins of morality because, as 
morality is a proscription of social order, the powerful who could create language 
would also be the ones who create morality.  Nietzsche’s premise that language 
and morality were connected by past societies is in step with Tönnies’ and 
Durkheim’s assertion that people and cultural motif were intimately inter-
connected in simpler societies; they would not, however, agree with Nietzsche 
that the inter-connectivity was a result of a separate group within the collectives 
but that morality and language would emerge mutually from the unity of the 
collective.  Nietzsche argues that such perspectives are grounded by a desire to 
perpetuate a morality that has been disconnected from its “noble” origin then 
changed into the original meaning’s antithesis and finally stagnated by “the herd 
instinct” (Ibid., 2). 
Nietzsche traced the significations of “good” and “bad” in several 
languages and claimed: 
I found they all led back to the same conceptual 
transformation—that everywhere "noble," "aristocratic" in the 
social sense, is the basic concept from which "good" in the sense 
of "with aristocratic soul," "noble," "with a soul of a high order," 
"with a privileged soul" necessarily developed: a development 
which always runs parallel with that other in which "common," 
"plebeian," "low" are finally transformed into the concept "bad" 
(Ibid., 4).  
 
He argues that his evidence is a “fundamental insight” into the origins of 
morality (Ibid.).  The implication of Nietzsche’s insights is that, at some point, 
 17
those who were thought “good” were dominated by those once thought “bad.”  
Furthermore, in regards to contemporary society, our moral valuations, which 
advocate equality and pacification, make up a progressive act of domination that 
took, according to Nietzsche, two thousand years and lasts still.   
Nietzsche’s explanation of the shift in morality is simultaneously a 
metaphoric and literal description of a large track of time he labels “the slave 
revolt in morality [italics in the original]” (Ibid., 7).  Once society had two 
authorities, each with their own set of moral valuations:  the “knightly-
aristocratic types” and the “priestly-noble types.”  The first group, who were 
dominant, were characterized by “war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, 
and in general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity” (Ibid.) while the 
second were craven, ascetic and impotent and who involved themselves in the 
destruction of “the” body in order to reach union with God, or as Nietzsche 
called “unio mystica” (Ibid., 6), which Nietzsche equates with “nothingness.”  
The priestly caste hated and resented the aristocratic caste because of the 
aristocrats’ power and vitality.  They waged a covert war of symbols, which the 
ascetic priests won due to their superior cleverness in using a much more 
powerful weapon that the aristocrats could not have foreseen:  religion.  Fear and 
guilt were ingrained into society and “good and bad” became “good and evil.”  
Nietzsche summarizes this shift with poetic fervor as a pronouncement by the 
ascetic priests to the vital aristocrats: 
“[T]he wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, 
lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone 
 18
are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them 
alone—and you, the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the 
evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity; 
and you shall be in all eternity the unblessed, accursed, and 
damned!” (Ibid). 
 
In this way, the priests packaged the discipline of asceticism into morality and 
gave it to the herd.  To unpack Nietzsche’s story is no meager task and to write 
“Nietzsche means this or that” is arrogant if it is meant to be taken at face value 
as Nietzsche rarely states what he means in such clear terms; as such, to derive 
meaning from Nietzsche’s writings is a personal act where to read what 
Nietzsche has written is to simultaneously project a bit of yourself onto the page 
and write along side him.  Thus, to add an important caveat for this thesis, when I 
write, “Nietzsche wrote…” it can just as easily be read, “Nietzsche and I 
wrote….”   
Part of the problem with relating the slave revolt and contemporary 
society from Nietzsche’s point of view is that description does not seem to have 
been as important to Nietzsche as analysis.  Most of his dealing with society has 
little description of the properties he is contemplating; he deals in inference, 
implication and irony.  That being said, the situation created by the slave revolt 
was one of illusory equality.  Morality became an instrument for slaves (ascetic 
priests) to give expression to their wills to power.  Not only did religion remain 
their domain, but they also spread into politics with their artificial promise of 
democracy and into economics by linking industriousness and selfless hard work 
to morality (thus keeping the herd tied to tireless production for the sake the 
 19
socially dominant).4  Thus, the reversal in morality brought about the reversal in 
society:  the slaves became masters and the masters became slaves (Nietzsche, 
1974, 1989, 1990, 1992, 2001). 
SOCIAL/COLLECTIVE/HERD EXPRESSIONS AND EVALUATIONS 
Tönnies argues that people living in gesellschaft come together in such a 
way as to create with their individual wills a social will; Tönnies refers to this 
social will as “the will of the Gesellschaft” (Tönnies, 2002, 70).  The larger 
social will of the Gesellschaft is discussed as being something artificial in the 
sense that it is constructed by “real” or single5 individuals: 
  [T]he existence of a Gesellschaft in the sense that it is 
used here is real at a given time.  It is something in the process of 
becoming, something which should be conceived here as 
personality of the general will or the general reason, and at the 
same time (as we know) it is fictitious and nominal.  It is like an 
emanation, as if it had emerged from the heads of the persons in 
whom it rests, who join hands eagerly to exchange across all 
distances, limits, and scruples, and establish this speculative 
Utopia as the only country, the only city, in which all fortune 
seekers and all merchant adventurers have a really common 
interest.  As the fiction of money is represented by metal or paper, 
it is represented by the entire globe, or by a circumscribed territory 
(Ibid., 76-77). 
 
It needs to be noted that Tönnies was reluctant to describe Gesellschaft as 
operating as an independent will; even though he often used this notion and 
wrote in terms of Gesellschaft willing, owning and having authority, he usually 
added the caveat that the idea was a metaphorical device for conceptual clarity 
                                                 
4 Weber’s Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism echoes and further develops Nietzsche’s 
assertions on the link between work and religion far beyond Nietzsche’s own analysis. 
5 Tönnies refers to collections of people in Gesellschaft, such as corporations, as “artificial 
individuals” I discuss this in more detail in Chapter III. 
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and not to be taken literally because of Gesellschaft’s artificiality (Ibid., 68).  The 
reasoning here is that artificial entities are created by the rational will of people 
and thus dependent upon that will for their continued existence.  This is 
problematic, however, as Tönnies directly describes other artificial entities, such 
as machines, as having independent wills.  Tönnies does not explain this seeming 
contradiction and it is outside the scope of this thesis for me to attempt 
reconciliation.   
I contend, contrary to Tönnies, that Gesellschaft does have an 
independent will just as other artificial entities, according to Tönnies, do.  I make 
this contention based on two points:  first, Tönnies’ uses of the term 
“Gesellschaft” as an independent will throughout his discussions on the topic and 
second, as Tönnies also asserts throughout (as in the first line of the above 
quote), fictitious things still have effects on people as real things.  Furthermore, I 
agree with Durkheim when he wrote in his The Rules of Sociological Method 
(1982), “A social fact is identifiable through the power of external coercion 
which it exerts or is capable of exerting upon individuals” (56), from which he 
then asserts, “The first and most basic rule is to consider social facts as things 
[italics in the original]” (60).  Though Durkheim would disagree with Tönnies’ 
negative interpretations of Gesellschaft, the concept of “Gesellschaft” does fit 
Durkheim’s definition of “social fact.” 
Gesellschaft is perpetually recreated through the wills of individuals who 
are its physical components but then comes to stand as other from them so 
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humans have become subjugated by their own creation.  Ironically, individuals 
continually reify Gesellschaft and thus perpetuate their subjugation.  Thus, as a 
collective creation, it stands as an alien oppressor to each individual when they 
are considered separately.  Gesellschaft is oppressive in the sense that it wills the 
freedom of individuals “divided and altered” (Tönnies, 2002, 76) through what 
Tönnies termed “convention” (Ibid.).  “Convention” is not used the same as it is 
commonly; it functions as customs and traditions do but it does not have the 
same sense of heritage (Ibid.).  Tönnies implies that Gesellschaft is ahistorical 
and does not have heritage or tradition because they are things people create 
communally in concert with one another.  Since, in Gesellschaft, people are 
divided from one another, convention cannot take on the same connotations it 
would have in Gemeinschaft.  Convention is a tool for the unity of Gesellschaft 
beyond individuals’ dependence on one another; it is a type of forced 
complacency with the existing order, which is, in turn, an internalization, mental 
dependence and acceptance of the existing social order. 
In Discipline and Punish (1995), Foucault talks about sovereigns from the 
example of a monarch.  A king monopolizes power and transmits it to others only 
so that his presence is extended beyond his corporal existence.  The monopoly 
and subsequent surplus of power displayed by the king has the ultimate effect of 
showing the powerlessness of the ruled (29).  Foucault labels any authority figure 
with such a surplus of power where the subject is forced to acknowledge his/her 
relative powerlessness “sovereign.”  Gesellschaft, as an “actual” independent and 
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acting will, has such power.  Tönnies points in this direction when he discusses 
the power of Gesellschaft as the objective (distant, rational) judge of value in 
exchange (Tönnies, 2002, 67-71) and that no individual is able to “confront” 
Gesellschaft (68).  To what purpose could something such as Gesellschaft put 
such power?  One could point out, ‘yes, society is more powerful than 
individuals so what does it help to look at it in terms of a Foucaultian sovereign?’  
Besides the subversion of individuals’ wills to its will, there is a global aspect as 
well.  Tönnies wrote of Gesellschaft:   
The whole country is nothing but a market in which to 
purchase and sell.  In the case of domestic trade, it functions 
alternatingly through absorption and contraction as systole, and 
through expulsion and expansion as diastole….  Each country can 
develop into such a trading area.  The more extensive the area, the 
more completely it becomes an area of the Gesellschaft, for the 
more widespread and freer trade becomes.  Trade tends, finally to 
concentrate in one main market, the world market, upon which 
other markets become dependent (Ibid., 79). 
 
Foucault argued to focus on the economies and structures of societies is to miss 
the mechanics of power that operate, “psychiatric interment, the mental 
normalization of individuals, and penal institutions have no doubt a fairly limited 
importance if one is only looking for their economic significance” (Foucault, 
2000, 117).  If Gesellschaft is looked at as an individual and the world market 
(with its contemporary correlate, globalization) is analyzed as an expression of 
power, then not only human relations but international relations also become 
based upon artificial convention and coercion. 
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Foucault argues the “web of power” is employed through many artifices 
by sovereigns for the sake of maintaining the imbalance of power between ruler 
and ruled.  These artifices are highly effective due to their tendency to normalize, 
individualize and divide the subject through increasingly rational and objective 
stances outside as well as within the focus of domination.  In a word, power in 
contemporary societies is maintained largely through precision.  Think of a 
clock; its mechanisms are relatively simple as is its purpose, i. e., to continually 
cycle through a determined combination of numbers.  A clock can also symbolize 
the power of Gesellschaft.  It is something external from us that we accept as 
being the determinant and divisor of our moment-to-moment experience; in 
Gemeinschaft, the passage of time was the changes in season; in Gesellschaft, 
clocks create time in ever divisible units.  Hours, minutes, seconds and now 
clocks come with an even smaller division, the millisecond.  The precision and 
efficiency of such machines as clocks has helped determine our expectations of 
humans to be more precise and efficient.  If a bus is a few minutes “behind 
schedule” people become frustrated that the bus driver does not better conform to 
the dictate of mechanized time; if someone is habitually late for work or class, 
he/she is told to buy a wristwatch (if not fired or failed).  Wearing a wristwatch 
then becomes a means of connecting machine and human so that the constant 
physical presence (not to mention the otherwise internal presence of the clock or 
as an example, the stress felt by realizing you “are late”) is a subjugation of 
human will to mechanized or “rational” will for the purposes of normalizing and 
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correcting the individual and simultaneously individualizing him/her through the 
personal governor of the wristwatch.  The example of clocks as an expression of 
Gesellschaft’s power leads in to two interconnected concepts Foucault used in 
unique ways:  gazes and panopticism.  
A panopticon is a watchtower built in the center of a circular prison where 
all the inmates can be observed by guards without the inmates knowing when 
they are observed.  This act of observation is the “gaze” where inmates feel 
themselves to be watched at all times since they cannot know when they are 
being watched.  The prisoners thus internalize the gaze by self-correcting their 
behavior to conform to the prescribed discipline of the prison regardless of what 
that discipline is.  As Foucault wrote, “[a] real subjection is born mechanically 
from a fictitious relation.  So it is not necessary to use force to constrain the 
convict to good behavior, the madman to calm, the worker to work, the 
schoolboy to application, the patient to the observation of the regulations (Ibid., 
202).”  The internalization of this subjugation by an alien power creates a soul, 
according to Foucault, which is born from the paradoxical activity of normalizing 
bodies in space and time.  In other words, the panopticon creates individuals by 
forcing people into normalized routes of behavior.   
I argue that Gesellschaft is a panopticon and we are its gazes.  Though 
this is a significant extension of Tönnies’ analysis of Gesellschaft, Foucault 
heads in that direction: 
The Panopticon's solution to this problem [of 
simultaneously intensifying power and production] is that the 
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productive increase of power can be assured only if, on the one 
hand, it can be exercised continuously in the very foundations of 
society, in the subtlest possible way, and if, on the other hand, it 
functions outside these sudden, violent, discontinuous forms that 
are bound up with the exercise of sovereignty (Ibid., 208). 
 
As Tönnies argues, individual members of Gesellschaft are “the very foundations 
of society” thus, a part of the perpetual reification of the will of Gesellschaft 
from our individual wills is to also inverse the relation so as to allow Gesellschaft 
to recreate us as individuals and then act through us as “gazers” upon one 
another:  people complaining about the bus driver who was late; employers and 
coworkers, professors and classmates asserting the “late” member needs a watch 
are all acts of gazing upon the “abnormal” member for the sake of normalization.  
As an aside for clarity, Foucault distinguishes between panopticism and 
sovereignty as the difference between abstract and corporeal existence; 
Gesellschaft analyzed in the present way is peculiar:  on the one hand it is an 
abstract expression of power from the point of view of individuals consisting of it 
and on the other, it has a physical dimension of existing within geographical 
boundaries as well.  Gesellschaft exists as both sovereign and panopticon in these 
ways.  As an example of sovereignty on this level, think of the “sudden, violent, 
discontinuous forms” that were manifested by the sovereign USA after the 
September 11, 2001 bombings.  The entire Middle East is presently being bent to 
the powerful sovereign as a demonstration of its relative powerlessness. 
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Durkheim directly argued there was a will or consciousness that emerged 
in both mechanical and organic societies that stands separate from the individuals 
making it up: 
The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the 
average members of a society forms a determinate system with a 
life of its own.  It can be termed the collective or common 
consciousness.  Undoubtedly the substratum of this consciousness 
does not consist of a single organ.  By definition it is diffuse over 
society as a whole, but nonetheless possesses specific 
characteristics that make it a distinctive reality.  In fact it is 
independent of the particular conditions in which individuals find 
themselves.  Individuals pass on, but it abides.  It is the same in 
north and south, in large towns and in small, and in different 
professions.  Likewise it does not change with every generation 
but, on the contrary, links successive generations to one another. 
Thus it is something totally different from the consciousnesses of 
individuals, although it is only realized in individuals (Durkheim, 
1997, 38-39). 
 
The collective consciousness, contrary to my extension of Tönnies analysis, is a 
unifying and moral entity that does not only extend geographically but 
temporally as well.  It is something diffuse, according to Durkheim, and cannot 
be located in any one part of society.  Since it is not located in any one organ, the 
government of a society cannot be seen as the collective consciousness; rather 
Durkheim argues the government is an expression and tool of the collective 
consciousness.  To illustrate, murder is not considered a crime against the 
government but a crime against “society;” what is invoked by the word “society” 
is the collective consciousness as it was not society that was murdered but an 
individual.  The murdered individual was a part of the collective consciousness 
and thus, since the collective consciousness still exists after the death of an 
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individual, it was the one left offended by the crime.  People still maintain wills 
of their own though and this causes a dual nature in humanity that is not always 
in congruence.  Each member of a society carries with him/her two 
consciousnesses:  the collective and their own.  The emotion of embarrassment is 
demonstrative of the internal existence of the collective in individuals because 
embarrassment is entirely dependent upon the collective for definition (Ibid.).   
In mechanical societies, individuals’ consciousnesses are wholly melded 
into the collective’s and thus there is hardly any conflict between the two.  
Idealistically, the same would hold for organic society; along with the expansion 
of the division of labor, however, comes an expansion of individuality that 
undermines the collective values and beliefs making up the collective 
consciousness.  Simultaneous expansion of the division of labor and individuality 
is occurs because organic society grows in two different ways.  As mentioned in 
the first section of this chapter, the division of labor expands as it assimilates 
different segments of society into organs, which Durkheim labels “dynamic 
density” and involves peoples of different world views coming into contact with 
one another thus disrupting the homogenized collective consciousness; this 
growth is analogous to a child growing taller.  The other form of growth is 
population density or, in other words, people tend to reproduce and with fewer 
environmental checks due to the increasing advancement of society, there are 
eventually enough people to weaken individual bonds; this growth is analogous 
to a child overeating and growing fatter.  Organic society’s growth and the 
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subsequent weakening of the collective consciousness leads to what Durkheim 
labeled “abnormal forms” of the division of labor (Ibid.; Giddens, 1984). 
The first abnormal form Durkheim discussed was “the anomic division of 
labor” and, he argued, the division of labor in society at the time he was writing 
had entered this form (Durkheim, 1997, 291).  Anomie is created when the 
division of labor has, in a sense, “gone too far.”  Laborers are divided to the point 
where they have little interaction with one another and no knowledge of the 
entire production process.  As a current illustration of this, imagine calling a 
large convenience store to ask if it has a certain item, if you end up talking with 
someone in sporting they will have no idea about the inventory in electronics and 
probably will not know the people who work in electronics either even though 
they work in the same store.  The laborers are working in a state of anomie where 
each individual is individualized by the division of labor.  Society does not fall 
apart at this point, however, due to organic solidarity; people are still dependent 
upon the division of labor for their material survival.  Beyond this material 
support, however, society provides little.  Moreover, when the organs of society 
are out of equilibrium with one another, which can occur as a result of several 
things such as unregulated economic competition, expansion or consumption, a 
state of anomie can arise.   
Etymologically, anomie comes from the ancient Greek anomos, which 
loosely means without custom/law/tradition; Tönnies argued this was a “natural” 
condition of Gesellschaft when he explained contemporary society does not fall 
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apart due to “convention.”6  In this way, Tönnies and Durkheim were describing 
similar phenomena when they attempted to explain how contemporary society 
avoided collapse.  Durkheim argues, contrary to Tönnies, anomie, though 
“abnormal,” occurs naturally as the division of labor expands much like growing 
pains.  Whether society will reach equilibrium is dependent on structural, not 
economic, reform.  In anomic organic society, workers are, as Tönnies argues, 
mere tools, means to another’s economic ends and as such, conflicts between 
labor and capital arise.  The answer is not to be found in socialism nor in liberal 
education but by re-embedding workers into the collective consciousness by 
allowing them knowledge of the process of production, where they fit in this 
process and for what they are ultimately working.  Knowledge of production 
would, contended Durkheim, provide workers with a sense of meaning and a 
moral connection with the collective (Ibid., 307-8). 
Another aspect of anomie, a moral aspect, is the emergence of what has 
come to be called “the cult of the individual” (Giddens, 1984, 80).  Durkheim 
describes this phenomenon as slightly bolstering the “mutated” collective 
consciousness of organic society: 
As all other beliefs and practices assume less and less 
religious a character, the individual becomes the object of a sort of 
religion.  We carry on the worship of the dignity of the human 
person, like all strong acts of worship, has already acquired its 
superstitions.  If you like, therefore it is indeed a common faith.  
Yet first of all, it is only possible because of the collapse of other 
                                                 
6 As discussed above, Tönnies was careful in defining convention to point out custom and tradition 
(in ancient Greek, nomos) could not be incorporated into its meaning as Gesellschaft did not have 
these things. 
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faiths and consequently it cannot engender the same results as that 
multiplicity of extinct beliefs.  There is no compensation 
(Durkheim, 1997, 122). 
 
Durkheim’s introductory clause, “If you like,” is interesting.  It seems to point to 
the theoretical difficulties the cult of the individual presents as if Durkheim were 
reluctantly conceding to a problem due to the religious character the individual 
takes on in organic society.  On the one hand, if the collective consciousness is 
continually declining in power to be replaced by organic solidarity and anomie 
then the cult of the individual cannot be looked at as a ubiquitous religious 
movement because that would imply a stronger collective consciousness than 
under a multiplicity of faiths; but on the other hand, if the cult of the individual is 
looked at as a ubiquitous religious movement, then anomie looses relevance and 
organic solidarity becomes less important because the cult of the individual 
would point to a re-emergence of mechanical solidarity within organic society 
and that is a fundamental contradiction in terms. 
Anthony Giddens, in his introduction to a selection of Durkheim’s 
writings, states that it is “fallacious” to argue that the conscious collectives of 
organic societies are as powerful as they were for mechanical societies because, 
to make such as argument would contradict the concept of anomie in organic 
society; I contend, however, that an anomic organic society can be said to have a 
strong, albeit “mutated,” conscious collective (Giddens, 1998, 7).  The basis for 
this assertion comes from an analysis not of the inherent structure of the division 
of labor but in the technological advance that come about because of it and the 
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ways in which the collective consciousness can be strengthened through them.  
Furthermore, the West’s shift from a production society to a service/consumer 
society, coupled with the technological advances of the division of labor and the 
cult of the individual, creates a situation where the collective consciousness of 
organic society is fundamentally different than, but just as strong as, that of 
mechanical societies without precluding the prominence of anomie.  This 
assertion seems counter-intuitive but here is what I mean:  individuals’ 
consciousnesses create and reify the collective consciousness individually so that 
their social connection is directly with the collective but not other individuals.  
Baudrillard’s (2004) The Consumer Society is helpful in extending Durkheim’s 
analysis in this way. 
Firstly, I assert the cult of the individual has evolved to the point where it 
is no longer a reverence for the dignity of the individual so much as it is an 
ascetic attempt at self-destruction to reach unio mystica with a Wholly Other and 
thus an attempt by the individual to become Wholly Other him/herself.  This is 
perpetuated by such service industry companies as marketing firms which extol 
consumers to “be yourself” through personalizable products.  Items are 
advertised to make you yourself; they are claimed to give one a personality that 
is your own.  Advertisers tell us to “stand out,” “be noticed” and “be different.”  
As Baudrillard pointed out, however, to be different is to be unnamable because 
if there is a label to describe you, you are not so different after all.  To be 
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unnamable, in other words, to defy language, is to destroy whatever you were 
before to become the Wholly Other.   
Secondly, as is implied by the above line of argument, anomie is not only 
present in advanced organic society, it is taken to new heights!  I imagine an 
embodiment of the twentieth century turning to the nineteenth and saying, “well, 
you guys were able separate from one another all right… gotta hand it to ya, not 
bad… gonna be tough to beat tha—I got it!  We’ll do ya one better and separate 
from our very selves!  Ha!  Anomie, my ass.”  Anomie is not only extended in 
the above sense but also in Durkheim’s use of the word through technological 
advances.  Look at how many infomercials there are advertising “work at home 
with your computer!” or colleges and universities offering online degrees up to 
Ph.D.  People who work in a factory may be anomic in their lack of overall 
knowledge and connection with others but at least they see other people.  There 
is television, ipod, blogging, blackberry and bluetooth all of which make living in 
a personalizable world possible where you do not ever have to “see” another 
person (this takes the above wristwatch analysis to a whole other level of 
normalization through individualization).  Increasingly, when we do have contact 
with other people it is through machines such as cell phones, instant messaging 
and electronic mail so that our contact is one dimensional digitized voices or 
typed messages; I contend this is an entirely new form of anomie when there is 
contact but the medium mechanizes the contact. 
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Lastly, the collective consciousness maintains strength in three ways:  the 
cult of the Wholly Other, the individual experience of advertisements and 
cultural outlets of technology.  In other words, the collective consciousness 
becomes an outcropping of the forms of anomie in contemporary society.  The 
cult of the Wholly Other creates the collective consciousness in much the same 
way Durkheim hesitantly admitted the cult of the individual “kind of” bolstered 
it; the cult of the Wholly Other is a more or less hegemonic ascetic moral system 
that unites people in organic society in the common goal of self annihilation in 
pursuit one of 976 personalized hair dyes that will make you “you.”  Baudrillard 
summed up the individual experience of advertisement when he wrote of the 
“symbolic, silent exchange between the proffered object and the gaze” (Ibid., 
166): 
Shop-windows thus beat out the rhythm of the social 
process of value:  they are a continual adaptability test for 
everyone, a test of managed projection and integration.  The big 
stores are a kind of pinnacle of this urban process, a positive 
laboratory and social testing ground, where, as Durkheim writes in 
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, the collectivity reinforces 
its cohesion, as in feasts and spectacles (Ibid.). 
 
Advertisement becomes a dialectic of reflexive power where the consumer gazes 
upon objects and values while advertisers gaze upon consumers in a perpetual 
show of consumption.  Thus the collective consciousness is emergent through the 
spectacle of consumption.  Finally the cultural outlets of technology provide a 
direct link to the collective consciousness through such things as television and 
the internet.  Culture producing industries such as Hollywood provide “popular” 
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culture, which is something that 1) was once just called “culture,” 2) was once 
produced and shared in common and 3) is now consumable in individualized 
formats (what special features would you like on your movie today?) you can 
download off the internet.  Culture is beamed and wired and passed through the 
air into televisions where you can watch alone in your home.  Public opinion can 
be made and then taken through polls on the internet without there ever having to 
be any human discussion.  The Occident is wired (or wireless at this point) 
individually; thus each person is individually plugged into the collective 
consciousness without any need for human contact. 
Nietzsche argues that we have a “herd instinct” that causes us to group 
together and become an indistinct mass.  Once we have formed such a herd, he 
asserts, we then emanate, not a will as with Tönnies and Durkheim per se, a herd 
mentality.  He argues that the herd instinct and mentality is just as strong after 
the slave revolt (if not stronger) as it was before and that the only difference is 
one of appearance: 
Parliamentarianism—that is, public permission to choose 
between five basic political opinions—flatters and wins the favor 
of all those who would like to seem independent and individual, as 
if they fought for their opinions. Ultimately, however, it is 
indifferent whether the herd is commanded to have one opinion or 
permitted to have five. Whoever deviates from the five public 
opinions and stands apart will always have the whole herd against 
him (Nietzsche, 1974, 174). 
 
Someone once told me it was easy to pick out a non-conformist because they all 
looked alike; it is much the same with contemporary society lauding of 
individuality and diversity.  There is no diversity or multiplicity if everyone is 
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diverse or multiple in the exact same ways.  Nietzsche contended that there was 
something inherently limiting about the herd mentality; there are so many “old 
truths” tied to the herd that anytime a “new truth” is created individuals of the 
herd and the herd itself will react to it with fear and hatred thus running from the 
truth or destroying it but never accepting it of its own accord. 
As with Durkheim’s collective consciousness, Nietzsche saw herd 
mentality to be a moral entity (that Nietzsche called himself an immoralist is 
important to keep in mind).  Morality is hierarchical; it is a ranking of attributes 
and actions humans have and/or do.  Thus, the herd mentality places a value on 
human activity, Nietzsche claims, and these value hierarchies are an expression 
of authoritative power wherein herds attribute different functionalities to 
individual members.  In other words, morality is a tool for differentiating the best 
ways the herd can use different people as tools themselves.  Moreover, Nietzsche 
argues the relativity of morality can be demonstrated by the varying herd 
mentalities.  Herds survive by responding to environmental pressures with 
morality as a code of useful and not useful behavior and as there are many 
different environments, there are many different moralities (Ibid., 116).  As with 
Durkheim, Nietzsche argues that in members of the herd there is a kind of dual 
nature expressed but the “kind of” is important because as Durkheim ascribes 
agency along with the social determinism of the collective to individuals, 
Nietzsche sees the herd mentality being a collective expression of the herd 
instinct of each member but the morality of the herd is not necessarily something 
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separate in the member.  The herd mentality and the herd instinct is so similar, 
Nietzsche often uses the labels interchangeably.   
Nietzsche does see a difference between herd instinct and herd mentality 
though.  He states that all people have the herd instinct but some (discussed in 
chapter II) are able to overcome this and thus avoid being enslaved by the herd 
mentality.  An aspect of the herd instinct that stays with us regardless is the 
desire to preserve our species.  Good and evil as expressions of herd mentality 
break down when the whole of the species is considered because every person, in 
their own way, gives expression to the desire to preserve the whole of humanity 
even if they did not, on the surface, intend it.   
Even the most harmful man may really be the most useful 
when it comes to the preservation of the species; for he nurtures 
either in himself or in others, through his effects, instincts without 
which humanity would long have become feeble or rotten. Hatred, 
the mischievous delight in the misfortune of others, the lust to rob 
and dominate, and whatever else is called evil belongs to the most 
amazing economy of the preservation of the species. To be sure, 
this economy is not afraid of high prices, of squandering, and it is 
on the whole extremely foolish. Still it is proven that it has 
preserved our race so far (Ibid., 1). 
 
There is a great deal in the above passage that is akin to Durkheim’s analysis of 
how crime strengthens the collective consciousness.  Durkheim argues crime is 
normative behavior that sets examples for other members of society and thus, as 
Nietzsche claims, helps preserve the species. 
Nietzsche, however, is not placing a positive value on the expression of 
herd instinct.  He argues cultures with strong herd instincts are weak, enslaved 
and decadent.  The people of such a culture are slaves in need of the domination 
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they receive from other slaves and the few who are individuals are quickly 
weeded out by the herd.  Higher cultures though are marked by “hovering in an 
interesting position that is usually dismissed as a mere decay of morals and 
corruption” (Ibid., 149).  He describes them as having a high degree of 
heterogeneity and many moralities.  This diversity of culture makes for strength 
of civilization and points to a possible way out of herd instinct.  In the first 
aphorism of The Gay Science (1974) Nietzsche makes the prophetic statement 
that one-day humanity will have a purpose (the principle of ebb and flood) but 
until then we can challenge the herd instinct by recognizing it as a comedy and 
laughing. 
VALUATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES 
Though Tönnies, Durkheim and Nietzsche had similar ideas, their texts 
rarely agree with one another.  The labels they chose to use and the definitions 
they gave to those labels are very telling; contemporary society was 
“mechanical” for Tönnies, “organic” for Durkheim and a “herd” for Nietzsche.  
It seems to me that much of the disagreement between these thinkers begins on 
the manifest content of their writings with their use of labels and then dives into 
the murky (though in many places in their texts, not so latent) depths of the 
values they placed upon highly organized society.  As Nietzsche argued, at the 
bottom of things, we find only ourselves; we ultimately play gods and construct 
the world and give it meanings and values where there were none before:  
everything is personal and everything comes down to values we project. 
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The differences between “mechanical,” “organic” and “herd” are ones not 
only of values, but also of focus.  Tönnies argued contemporary society was 
mechanical because it brings people together in artificial, automated ways; we 
are valuable only in our functionality for each other.  Durkheim called society 
organic because he saw an analogy with cells and organs of a biological body; 
society brings people together and organizes them not only for the survival of the 
group, but also to the care and development of each individual dependent upon 
the group.  For Nietzsche, society was a herd because each individual acted as an 
unthinking thing rather than as a willful human being; we express the same 
things, carry the same thoughts and even look the same7 and this sameness, 
though beneficial for the group, destroyed the “humanness” of the individual.8  I 
argue that all three have valid points and evaluations about and of the “nature” of 
contemporary society. 
In Tönnies’ analysis of Gesellschaft, in regards to its division of labor, he 
argues the majority of people (the laborers) are enslaved to capitalist and 
merchant classes.  Laborers must sell the only thing they own, their labor, in 
order to survive.  Laborers have no agency; their lives are constructed for them 
around the goal of creating profits for others.  Moreover, it is not necessarily 
another human being to whom they are subjugated:  “the tools, organized as 
                                                 
7 I discussed how this does not contradict with anomie above.  Furthermore, in The Rules of 
Sociological Method, Durkheim wrote:  “If I do not conform to ordinary conventions, if in my 
mode of dress I do not heed to what is customary in my country and in my social class, the 
laughter I provoke, the social distance at which I am kept, produce, although in a more mitigated 
form, the same results as any real penalty” (51). 
8 We carry with us similar valuations from popular culture through the years; look at Charlie 
Chaplin’s Modern Times, Cary Grant’s Father Goose and Bryan Forbes’ Stepford Wives. 
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machines in systems of production, are served in their work by, and dominate, 
the toiling human beings.  Thus, these toilers are no longer directly dependent so 
much upon an alien human will which gives them orders as upon the given 
qualities of a ‘dead monster’…” (Ibid., 99).  Humans created tools and then the 
creations came to dominate the creators through a perverse degradation by 
Gesellschaft.   
Though tools do not have life outside of Gesellschaft, in Gesellschaft, 
they are imbued with what Tönnies labels “rational will,” which is an artificial 
will created by thought and existing only in reference to the person (or thing) 
creating it, thus they have the appearance of life because they have the 
appearance of thought (Ibid., 103).  For Tönnies, there is a sense of an objective 
reality but Gesellschaft simultaneously is and creates artificialities and fictions.  
The machines that dominate laborers have lives in fiction but are in “actuality” 
inorganic and ‘dead.’  They can be considered ‘monsters’ in many senses.  They 
are slave drivers forcing laborers to keep pace with the unyielding, inexorable 
pace of the machines.  I imagine a laborer in a factory at the end of the nineteenth 
century working on an assembly line.  The large, dirty, oddly-shaped machine 
subverting the laborer’s will while it spewed foul-smelling smoke and released a 
deafening, never ending roar of grinding metal and clanking gears may have 
seemed a nightmarish incubus.  It is also possible to think of “dead monsters” in 
the Occidental Gesellschaft of the twenty-first century.  Computers are a prime 
example.  People commonly refer to them as having “thoughts” and “desires” as 
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in “I told my computer to ‘save’ but it didn’t want to.”  We have to work with 
computers on their schedules (how often have you had a computer ‘freeze’ on 
you or a particular program “refused” to work?).  People fear them as monsters 
(not just children who must be “introduced” to computers early in their lives or 
the elderly who sometimes take computer classes to alleviate their fears of 
computers but also a broader group of people who express a desire to pass laws 
to protect people from the “dangers” of computers) to which the presence, in our 
vocabularies, of the word “technophobia” attests. 
These fictions of Gesellschaft should not be read in the sense they are not 
“real” per se but more along the lines that they are, according to Tönnies, 
abstraction we have created that exist independent of the external “natural” 
world.  Our fictions, however, are no less real because they are “dead” nor is it 
the case that they have no effect on things existing in the external “natural” 
world; they are real in effect regardless of their amorphous origins.  In a way, 
Tönnies’ analysis of Gesellschaft makes us into Dr. Frankenstein where we did 
not know what we were creating nor could we control it once it was created.  In 
the end, we find our monster to be more powerful than us.  In a way, we end up 
its creation just as much as it is ours; Tönnies writes in regards to labor becoming 
a commodity, “Divided up or increased or changed in character or appearance, 
the commodity must never be consumed; it must, so to speak, perish that it may 
be resurrected in the forms of goods.”  The laborer, who is separated from 
products through the division of labor, pours who he/she is, the thing that defines 
 41
him/her, into the creation of an artificial commodity.  The defining act of 
laboring destroys the labor to recreate it into a fiction made material.  We 
become the “Modern Day Prometheus” then find ourselves having to suffer 
Prometheus’ Olympian punishment. 
Nietzsche agrees things are artificial; we live in a world of illusion but, he 
adds, there is something beyond this something deeper than some concept of 
“objective reality,” a different way of being that we could never have reached if 
we had not learned the lessons we are just beginning to understand from the slave 
revolt.  One point he makes in several places is that the slave revolt was positive 
for humanity; it gave us depth of thought and emotion we, up to that point, were 
lacking.  There may be a long way yet to go, but Nietzsche is an optimist and 
argued humanity will redeem itself from the necessary resentment, enslavement 
and degradation that Nietzsche finds so nauseating and in which we now find 
ourselves.  On the point of slavery and degradation, Nietzsche and Durkheim are 
most divergent, though both use language point to the depths of humanity, 
Durkheim sees the collective being that depth whereas Nietzsche argues the 
collective acts as a buoy, holding people back. 
In the Division of Labor (1997), Durkheim argued organic society may 
appear oppressive but people must have a moral code that is both internal and 
external in order for mutual survival and morality requires a deprivation of 
freedom to a degree.  For Durkheim formation of society is one of the 
fundamental defining points of humanity and to rail against it for some other 
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perceived definition is a rejection of our species for egoistic endeavors.  As we 
are dependent on society for our very selves we have no right to free ourselves 
from the duties and moral obligations this entails—we owe society our very 
selves: 
The members are linked by ties that extend well beyond the 
very brief moment when the act of exchange is being 
accomplished.  Each one of the functions that the members 
exercise is constantly dependent upon others and constitutes with 
them a solidly linked system.  Consequently the nature of the task 
selected derives from duties that are permanent.  Because we fulfil 
this or that domestic or social function we are caught up in a 
network of obligations from which we have no right to disengage 
ourselves (Ibid., 173). 
 
The interdependence of all the parts of society creates a moral requirement that 
binds even the foundations of society.  I agree that human relations must come 
with a moral character in order to exist but there are limits; when the binds of a 
relationship are too demanding or negate a sense of individual dignity, then those 
binds of interdependence have dissolved from being moral to being coercive. 
Whereas Tönnies and Durkheim analyze contemporary society from the 
starting points of economics and social structure and then discuss the cultural 
aspects, Nietzsche interprets the cultural aspects and then discusses indirectly 
social structure and economics.  He argues that contemporary culture is sickly, 
weak and, seemingly paradoxically, oppressive.9  Our present culture did not 
become this way by accident or some “natural” evolution but was created by us 
just as all truths, values and realities are created by us.  One of the problems with 
                                                 
9 Society is weak and oppressive because the victory of the slaves or common people had good 
PR; everyone submits to the weakness and becomes weak him/herself—thus oppressed. 
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the herd is that there are so many members.  Herd mentality retains its divine-like 
strength over individuals because individuals are so small compared to the 
crushing weight of the sheer magnitude of the herd.  Many of these people feel as 
though they have a right to live merely because of the recognition of their 
existence; Nietzsche argues this does not follow but does not clearly (only 
metaphorically) say how he differentiates people along the “superfluous” and 
“not-superfluous” or how someone else could judge another’s life as somehow 
less than life; he leaves that for us to decipher.10  He does, however, tell us we 
are all superfluous under the state and simultaneously, “All-too-many are born:  
for the superfluous the state was invented” (Nietzsche, 1995, 11).  In his 
valuation of “the state,” which Nietzsche equates as being a “modern herd” and 
does not only have governments in mind, but the whole of contemporary society, 
“State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters.  Coldly it tells lies too; and 
this lie crawls out of its mouth:  ‘I, the state, am the people’” (Ibid).  Nietzsche 
claim that the state is not the people does not necessarily stand in contradiction to 
my extension of Tönnies’ Gesellschaft or Durkheim’s collective consciousness; 
on the contrary, he sees the state as an independent will of the group but it is not 
the “people.”  Humans cannot be reduced to society because we are something 
more, something deeper; something different and other.  This is not to be 
confused with the cult of the Wholly Other, though I am using similar language 
                                                 
10 This was interpreted along racial lines by the Nazis who took Nietzsche’s writings, as altered by 
his sister, and applied them to “the Jewish problem,” even though Nietzsche clearly states in 
several places that such judgments cannot be based upon race, nationality or gender.  He also 
attacks nationalism, using German nationalism as an example, as being enslaving and an 
expression of a sick will to power that needed to be uprooted before humanity could “progress.” 
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here, the cult of the Wholly Other is something on the surface of humanity; it is 
an expression of the state not of the people. 
In a pleading, almost desperate tone, Nietzsche begs us to see what the 
state does to humanity, how is sacrifices us on its own alter: 
The state, I call it, where all are drink poison, the good and 
the wicked; state, where all lose themselves, the good and the 
wicked; the state, where the slow suicide of all is called “life.”  
Behold the superfluous!  They steal the works of the inventors and 
the treasures of the sages for themselves; “education” they call 
their theft- and everything turns to sickness and misfortune for 
them.  Behold the superfluous! They are always sick; they vomit 
their gall and call it a newspaper. They devour each other, and 
cannot even digest themselves.  Behold the superfluous! They 
gather riches and become poorer with them.  They want power and 
first the lever of power, much money—the impotent paupers!  
Watch them clamber, these swift monkeys! They clamber over one 
another and thus drag one another into the mud and the depth.  
They all want to get to the throne:  that is their madness—as if 
happiness sat on the throne.  Often mud sits on the throne—and 
often also the throne on mud.  Mad they all appear to me, 
clambering monkeys and overardent.  Foul smells their idol, the 
cold monster:  foul they smell to me altogether, these idolaters 
(Nietzsche, , 11). 
 
Nietzsche tells us it is better to jump out a window than remain in such a 
situation.  Nietzsche agrees with Tönnies and Durkheim that we are isolated from 
one another in contemporary society by our own egoistic tendencies but part of 
the answer to this state of anomie requires a revaluation of values where material 
interdependence or a stronger state is not part of the equation. 
Gesellschaft is not only analyzed in terms of labor and economics; 
Tönnies also, though to a much smaller and more indirect degree, analyzed 
broader cultural ramifications of Gesellschaft.  Though Tönnies discusses 
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cultural aspects of Gesellschaft, I extend his analysis here by making a 
distinction between social (by which I am referring solely to structural/economic 
aspects) Gesellschaft and cultural (by which I am referring to the way Tönnies 
uses the concept of culture—see below in present paragraph) Gesellschaft.  I do 
not mean this distinction to imply two separate things but for theoretical clarity, 
two expressions of Gesellschaft that go hand-in-hand.  A group’s culture, for 
Tönnies, is the way in which the individual members interact with one another 
and the way the group maintains its members (Ibid., 59).  Tönnies, in keeping 
with his critical tone throughout his treatise, or as Lewis Coser (1997) put it:  
“Tönnies’s dyspeptic picture of the present and his glorification of the past” 
(found in:  introduction to Division of Labor in Society xv), paints a stark picture 
of culture in Gesellschaft. 
People stand in coercion to one another in Gesellschaft, which is 
corrosive to unifying human themes such as trust.  There can be no “real” trust 
between people as each person seeks to further his or her personal interest as the 
primary goal of social interaction.  There is, however, a “fictitious” trust that 
must be created for the sake of credit.  Much of Gesellschaft is based upon 
promised actions (the merchant promises to deliver goods, the tenant farmer 
promises to pay for use of land, the debtor promises to repay a loan with interest) 
yet when people are unified mainly in their mutual need for others to satisfy 
varying self-interests, it becomes naïve at best to accept another’s promise as 
could have been done in Gemeinschaft.  Gesellschaft’s dependence on promises 
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is problematic because “in contradistinction to the concept of Gesellschaft, a 
bond has been created, uniting not objects but persons” (Ibid., 74).  The problem 
of mistrust is “solved” through formalized and codified promises, i. e., contracts 
(Ibid., 71).  Contracts serve as a good example of a profound cultural shift.  In 
Gemeinschaft things that are organic and internal such as trust between people 
must be mutated into something mechanical and external in Gesellschaft.  
Tönnies does not analyze this shift deeply in terms of internal/external and 
instead focuses more on subjective/objective shifts in mental life.   
I find, however, the internal made external to be more foundational as it is 
material (a contract may be objective but so too can trust can also be objective; 
whereas you cannot physically hold someone else’s trust; you cannot read it as 
with a contract).  The very externality of a contract effectively kills anything but 
a fictitious semblance of trust by making something three dimensional in its 
internality into a two dimensional chimera of its former self.  The depths of this 
cultural shift are that it has moved out of “business culture” into the private lives 
of people.  Take for example pre-nuptial agreements; we have a romantic ideal in 
Occidental culture that marriage is no longer a business agreement but about the 
“joining of two hearts.”  Perhaps at one point, for a period of time, Western 
culture did make a shift from class/status reasons for marriage to reasons of love 
but even when marriage was about class and/or status at least it was known as 
such.  By contrast, in advanced Gesellschaft, people operate under a construct of 
marriage as being about love while the prevalence of pre-nuptial contracts is 
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rising.  The projection of internal trust onto an external contract also raises 
Tönnies’ point about an subjective/objective shift as it changes marital love from 
a subjective, organic and personal emotion into an objective, mechanical and 
legal commitment. 
Furthermore, we can look to one of contemporary Gesellschaft’s cultural 
mediators, television, for an example of the externality of trust between friends.  
In the past decade, there has been a sharp increase in the number of judicial 
shows such as “People’s Court” (this trend also demonstrates a process of 
cultural Gesellschaft fictionalizing government).  These shows often depict two 
“friends” or family members who are suing one another over personal loans, 
borrowed items or something else of the sort.  Leaving aside how the presence of 
friends on such a show is an objectification of friendship and family relations by 
cultural and social Gemeinschaft (cases dealing with television blurs my 
cultural/social distinction as television is both a tool for cultural representation as 
well as economic profit), these shows demonstrate another area where internal 
life is externalized as one of the people typically enters a contract between the 
two parties into evidence.  What is particularly striking to me, however, are the 
cases when neither person has a contract; in these instances, the presiding judge 
typically advises the those involved (this includes, by implication, those 
watching the show) to “always get a contract” when making an agreement 
because “you can’t trust anyone.”  The judges’ advice injected into a 
representation of cultural Gesellschaft illustrates the values of Gesellschaft as 
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well as the mechanized method of reification of those values.  I put emphasis on 
the particular example of court shows because of perceived authority:  Tönnies 
asserts governments are representatives of Gesellschaft’s authority (Ibid., 74) and 
judges are representatives of the government. 
As stated above, my distinction between cultural and social Gesellschaft 
is merely for theoretically clarity and the issue of trust illustrates their close 
connection.  Trust cannot exist in Gesellschaft due to the inherent competition in 
the division of labor (capitalists compete with other capitalists laborers compete 
with one another for jobs, etc.).  Suspicion and mistrustful vigilance are not only 
valued under Gesellschaft but also necessary as “Competition has been described 
by many pessimists as an illustration of the war of all against all, which a famous 
thinker has conceived as the natural state of mankind” (Ibid., 77).  This passing, 
tongue-in-cheek, reference to Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1994) offers a telling 
insight further into how Tönnies evaluates Gesellschaft.  Hobbes argued that 
humans began in a state of nature without any constraints on freedom but 
because of an innate “evil,” the state of nature necessarily resulted in a state of 
war.  People then created society where they gave up some of their freedom for 
peace and safety.  Tönnies turns Hobbes’ explanation on its head by equating 
Gesellschaft with the state of war.  Hobbes saw society as something higher and 
more humane than the state of nature; thus, according to Tönnies’ reformulation, 
Gesellschaft is lowly and inhumane. 
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Looking at his assertion that Gesellschaft must continually expand to new 
land and his analysis of individuals in Gesellschaft culture as being predatory, 
selfish and destructive, however, I think the current academic discussions about 
the Occident’s role in globalization lends credence to the argument that 
Gesellschaft is an independent will of its own.  One of the defining 
characteristics of this social will is that it must constantly expand and exceed its 
geographical bounds looking for new markets and new lands to “penetrate and 
revolutionize” (Tönnies, 2002, 79) in order to survive.  From this perspective, the 
Occident plays the combined roles of capitalist, merchant and creditor; then the 
Gesellschafts of lesser developed countries would play varying roles of laborer, 
debtor or coalition member depending upon the relative power of their respective 
social wills and the invested self-interest of the social will of the Occident.  
Furthermore, in my extension of Tönnies’ analysis, the Occident would be 
expected to do precisely what it is doing:  consuming instead of producing and 
exploiting the less powerful.  Tönnies does leave a ray of hope in the dark picture 
he paints of Gesellschaft; he sees it as being decadent in a way and a killer of 
cultures but if some fragments of Gemeinschaft survive the dominance of 
Gesellschaft, Tönnies pointed out there may be a counter-emergence of 
Gemeinschaft within a dying Gesellschaft (Truzzi, 1971). 
Nietzsche and Tönnies paint similar pictures of society but from different 
angles.  Both agree the turn to Gesellschaft has left us in a state degradation and 
slavery.  Nietzsche, however, argues this was necessary for us to learn something 
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about ourselves and to develop deeper felt affects that will help us develop into 
the next evolution.  Tönnies is not nearly as optimistic as Nietzsche and just 
leaves us with a “possibly” better future in finding some communal remnant after 
Gesellschaft dies (if it dies).  Durkheim ended with a summary of the problem 
and a suggested solution: 
It has been rightly stated that morality—and by that must 
include both theory and practice of ethics—is in the throes of an 
appalling crisis. What we have expounded can help us understand 
the causes and nature of this sickness. …If this be so, the remedy 
for the ill is not to seek to revive traditions and practices that no 
longer correspond to present-day social conditions, and that could 
only subsist in a life that would be artificial, one only of 
appearance. We need to put a stop to this anomie, and to find ways 
of harmonious co-operation between those organs that still clash 
discordantly together.  We need to introduce into their 
relationships a greater justice by diminishing those external 
inequalities that are the source of our ills (Durkheim, 1997, 340).  
 
I do not know about the future but I know I do not want to wait for some possible 
distant future to materialize.  There must be something that can be done under 
Organic Gesellschaft to create a moral standard, a sense of nobility, among 
people in intimate, “authentic” human connection.  I agree with Durkheim that 
any hearkening back to ancient traditions would fail at inception as a farce but 
what if, as Nietzsche argues, we could create something new? 
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CHAPTER III 
INDIVIDUALS 
In concert with the ideas discussed in the first chapter, this second part 
deals with individuality under Gesellschaft.  This chapter can be loosely seen as 
consisting of two parts.  The first deals with problematic forms of 
individualization and individuality in contemporary society.  This “problems” 
part deals with Tönnies, Baudrillard and Foucault and the many ways individuals 
are “produced” in Gesellschaft while authentic individuality remains illusory.  
The last section puts Durkheim and Nietzsche in conversation with one another 
about individuality with a mind to party discover, partly create a concept of 
authentic individuality.  Nietzsche is relied upon heavily with his concept of 
higher types but it must be cautioned, these “higher types” are problematic 
because Nietzsche romanticizes them to the point of creating a new mythology.  
Though these fabled higher types can be useful as ethereal models, they must not 
be taken for literal people living in the “real” world of Gesellschaft.  People may 
have a will of their own but this is tempered by a great deal of determinism by 
the collective consciousness they are raised under.  Therefore, any 
conceptualization of an authentic individual must take into consideration the 
existing culture of our time. 
Tönnies’ concept of human will is dependent upon the social contexts he 
describes.  Between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft there is a great deal of 
difference as to the varying degrees to which wills can express agency.  Then 
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there is also the difference between natural and rational will as to what is 
expressed through agency.  Rational will is connected with Gesellschaft, while 
natural will is connected with Gemeinschaft (discussed in more detail in chapter 
III).  Rational will is in relation to abstract things such as wealth and as such, is a 
will that ties humans to fictions instead of objects or others.   
According to Tönnies, the perpetuation of Gesellschaft is dependent upon 
fictions created by individuals’ wills.  By way of simple example let me use a 
man wanting to buy a beer in a bar.  The bartender informs the man a beer costs 
four dollars to which the man agrees and pays the amount.  In this instance, the 
will of whomever set the price of the beer (for this simplistic example I will 
bypass questions of economic competition, marketing and all the other macro-
level considerations that go into determining pricing for goods and service as 
Tönnies’ argument deals with the meeting of wills and the multitude of wills that 
determine the price of a good or service is irrelevant at this point) has set the 
value of the beer at four dollars which is an inflation of the worth of the beer as 
Tönnies argues, in Gesellschaft, individuals will only provide something to 
another if they view the thing provided as less valuable than the thing they 
receive in return:  “all goods are conceived to be separate, as also are their 
owners.  What somebody has and enjoys, he has and enjoys to the exclusion of 
all others.  So, in reality, something that has a common value does not exist” 
(Tönnies, 2002, 65).  Humans in Gesellschaft are trite and selfish; they are 
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alienated from one another in one sense by individual constructions of value 
around material goods. 
The man who pays four dollars only does so because he has willed the 
four dollars to be less valuable than the beer.  As Tönnies writes, “Its [a good 
with a common value] existence may, however, be brought about through fiction 
on the part of individuals, which means that they have to invent a common 
personality and his will, to whom this common value has to bear reference” 
(Tönnies, 2002, 65).  So at this basic form of connection between individuals 
living in Gesellschaft, the merging of wills between two people is artificial 
because it creates something that does not exist (a beer = four dollars) and this 
fiction of equal value does not exist because both people think they are “really” 
receiving something of greater value for something of lesser value.  The model of 
human relations presented here is but one of many that exist within Gesellschaft 
but it is an antagonistic one where people ironically come together in opposition 
to one another setting human connection as an alienation of people involved 
motivated by self-interest to the perceived detriment of others.   
One could question Tönnies’ argument based upon “actuality,” or in other 
words, a beer cannot “actually” be both more and less valuable than four dollars 
simultaneously; the important point, however, is not what is “actually” 
happening but the construction of values that occurs between two or more 
individual wills in connection with one another.  The common will created by the 
bartender and the man is an artifice in Gesellschaft that allows both to “pretend” 
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an agreement in value while both people retain a will divorced of the created 
commonality that perceives each individual as being advantageous in the 
exchange.  The problem with this is not only that the connection is antagonistic 
and artificial but also it is fragmented as both individuals exist “together” in the 
artificial combined will while also existing separate from one another thus 
neither can be wholly with the other nor wholly him/herself.  Thus human 
connection is made paradoxically divisive by the attributes of Gesellschaft. 
By Tönnies perspective, human nature is coercive and exploitative but 
this is a reflection of the will of Gesellschaft (see Chapter I) and is not an a priori 
nature inherent to humanity but one constructed by the needs of such an alienated 
collective.  This war of all against all where people feel themselves to be 
individuals seeking to further their self-interests is an illusory, or artificial, 
individuality because, since they are all alienated from one another and must be 
on guard for other trying to exploit them, they are “actually” all fellows in a 
perverse way.  They are all in a common plight and individuality cannot be said 
to exist under the weight of such immense uniformity. 
There are three other ways in which individuality is illusory in 
Gesellschaft that I wrote about in Chapter I and bears mentioning in this chapter 
as well:  Foucault’s concept of individualization, the dialectics of difference in 
advertisement and the cult of the individual/Wholly Other.  Foucault argued that 
armies were once made of men with particular bodies that the body of a soldier 
had certain features that made him a better choice for the military than another.  
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Over time, however, bodies came to be seen as malleable and the military began 
to think of the recruit as clay to be molded into a soldier through a process of 
“correction.”  The focus of military discipline on the individual bodies of recruits 
did two things:  1.  it normalized the recruits by making them virtually 
indistinguishable from one another and 2. it individualized the troops by making 
each body a focus of power so that they were individualized without becoming 
individuals.  The military discipline then spread to other parts of highly 
organized societies by many methods over many decades but has ended in the 
dominance of militaristic discipline in most facets of life under Gesellschaft.  
Bureaucracy is a prime example.  It is highly rational, highly efficient and highly 
mechanical.  It is democratic; everyone is treated the same.  It obsessively 
maintains records on all individuals with whom it comes into contact.  Aside 
from the replacement of human relations where rules are bent and exceptions 
made with cold, logical, inhumane control by “the” rules or “the” computer (my 
sixteen year-old brother went to bed one night and woke up the next day to find 
he had aged thirty-nine years as AARP informed him he was a member and they 
were lobbying to protect his right to social security—somehow his information 
ended up in AARP’s system and it took a great deal of time and effort to change 
the computer’s mind that my brother was not fifty-five years old); the rule of 
bureaucracy also individualizes peoples.  As Foucault argued, bureaucratic 
control creates artificial individuals (my fifty-five year old brother) in the files 
and notes kept on people (at the registrar’s office I am an individual data set—a 
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GPR, a social security number, a department, etc.) but these individual constructs 
do not reflect who people are because that is irrelevant (I would like to think I am 
more than just a GPR) the important thing is maintaining the rule of form, file 
and above all rationality (Foucault, 1995). 
Baudrillard describes the shift in marketing from recognizing the agency 
of individuals to seeing them as deterministic automatons from whom must be 
hidden the shift to determinism from the previous assumption, 
that it is the individual who exercises power in the economic 
system.  That emphasis on the power of the individual contributed 
largely to legitimating organization:  all the dysfunctions, 
nuisances and inherent contradictions of the order of production 
are justified since they extend the scope of consumer sovereignty.  
It is clear, by contrast, that the whole economic and psycho-
sociological apparatus of market research, motivational studies, 
etc., which, it is claimed, ensured that real demand and the deep 
wants of the consumer govern the market, exists solely to stimulate 
that demand in order to create further outlets for products while 
constantly masking this objective process by staging its opposite.  
‘Man only became an object of science for man when automobiles 
became harder to sell than to manufacture’ (Baudrillard, 2004, 
72).11
 
Thus, marketing firms have grabbed onto the cult of the individual that permeates 
advanced organic society and perpetuated it to further their own economic 
interests.  The illusion of individuality is a precarious state of mind in 
contemporary society; the drive to be Wholly Other is a weakness that is easily 
exploited by those who understand it.  By thinking of people in terms of 
collectives but appear to think of them as individuals allows the further 
                                                 
11 For all my conspiracy nut buddies out there:  here is at least one example where you’re not just 
paranoid, they really are out to get you! 
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exploitation and oppression of humans by cultural Gesellschaft through the 
perpetuation of an artificial self-concept that prevents people from authenticate 
connections with fellows (wait a minute—all you people are crampin’ my style, 
I’m an individual ya know…).12  
Baudrillard relied on David Riesman to make several of his points in The 
Consumer Society and a brief introduction to some of his concepts here will help 
in the upcoming analysis of Tönnies use of “politeness” in Gesellschaft.  In The 
Lonely Crowd, Riesman (2001) argues there has been several fundamental shifts 
in culture which he characterizes with three ideal types that correspond with 
three different socio-cultural which existed and exist in distinct spacio-temporal 
periods:  tradition-directed, inner-directed and other-directed.  A person who was 
tradition-directed “tends to reflect his membership in a particular age-grade, clan 
or caste; he learns to understand and appreciate patterns which have endured for 
centuries, and are modified but slightly as the generations succeed each other.  
The important relationships of life may be controlled by careful and rigid 
etiquette…” (Riesman, 2001, 11).   
Inner-directed types emerge in a culture that provides a higher level of 
security for those operating within it.  The inner-directed types reify society by 
looking inwardly “in the sense that [this inward direction] is implanted early in 
life by the elders and directed toward generalized but nonetheless inescapably 
destined goals” (ibid., 15).  Riesman is then able to extend the analysis into the 
                                                 
12 Maybe McDonald’s past advertising slogan “It’s a McWorld” was not so much marketing as 
calling a spade a spade…. 
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next shift, which occurred in the United States during the twentieth century.  The 
last shift was to the narcissistic, child-like other-directed types.  An other-
directed type is “shallower, freer with his money, friendlier, more uncertain of 
himself and his values, more demanding of approval…” (ibid., 19).  Jean 
Baudrillard (America, 1999; The Perfect Crime, 2002) describes present society 
as the time after the perfect crime or the murder of “reality.”  He claims we now 
live in an endless circulation of fictions where we cannot tell the difference 
between illusion and “reality;” seeing the Great Pyramid of Las Vegas is no 
different to us than going to Giza (excepting, of course, that Las Vegas has the 
Eiffel Tower as well).  Since we are narcissistic while simultaneously “uncertain 
of ourselves” we can pick up an identity, a simulacra work identity for example, 
and when we tire of that fiction move on.   
We Americans love friendly, shallow people circulating through one 
simulacra identity after another especially in a service industry outlet (is there 
anything in America left that still produces something material?) where people 
are friendly and tell us “have a nice day,” just as they said to the last person and 
the one before that.  Among all the coercion and competition among people in 
Gesellschaft, Tönnies, nonetheless, wrote, “Its [Gesellschaft’s] supreme rule is 
politeness” (Tönnies, 2002, 78).  This politeness while attempting to gain the 
advantageous position is, Tönnies argues, part of an exchange of objects and 
signs; a convention of Gesellschaft based on Gemeinschaft emotions in 
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appearance, it became an artificial symbol to be exchanged as an illusory 
commodity. 
Baudrillard, in America (1999), links the discussion over the past two 
chapters of Gesellschaft with herd mentality with globalization with the cult of 
the individual, etc. in one fell swoop: 
It [the American smile] is part of the general 
cryogenization of emotions.  It is, indeed, the smile the dead man 
will wear in his funeral home….  The smile of immunity, the smile 
of advertising:  ‘This country is good.  I am good.  We are the 
best’.  It is also Reagan’s smile—the culmination of the self-
satisfaction of the entire American nation—which is on the way to 
becoming the sole principle of government.  An autoprophetic 
smile, like all signs in advertising.  Smile and others will smile 
back.  Smile to show how transparent, how candid you are.  Smile 
if you have nothing to say.  Most of all, do not hide the fact you 
have nothing to say nor your total indifference to others.  Let this 
emptiness, this profound indifference shine out spontaneously in 
your smile.  Give your emptiness and indifference to others, light 
up your face with the zero degree of joy and pleasure, smile, smile, 
smile… Americans may have no identity, but they do have 
wonderful teeth [italics in original] (34). 
 
This lack of authenticity points to a possible explanation for Nietzsche writing 
that we are all superfluous.  I think of the uniquely American logic of dropping 
“care packages” over poverty-stricken town in Afghanistan after destroying them 
with technologically advanced (relative in consideration of the arms race we are 
having with ourselves that is) missiles.  But then, perhaps Ronald McDonald will 
“win their hearts and minds.”  We reward people greatly for this lack of 
authenticity and thus further reify Gesellschaft’s power.  In the service industry, 
as just one example, people tip servers who constantly smile, who are nice.  How 
many times have you heard people say something negative about another person 
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and then add “but he/she is nice,” as though this niceness were all that truly 
mattered anyway.  Tönnies argued Gesellschaft was artificial and we now have 
been created in the image of this idol.  
Nietzsche wrote a great deal about agency and determinism.  Contrary to 
the above analyses, however, he saw reason for optimism, even gaiety and thus 
steers the present discussion out of such nauseating waters.  He wrote of humans 
not as a species but as several actions.  As actions, individuals are in a constant 
state of emergence or becoming, which Nietzsche constructs into three ideal 
types:  the camel, the lion and the playful child.  The camel is reverent and bears 
all things; it wants to be led and struggles to please all who lead it.  This is the 
first stage of human becoming and it is the stage at which most remain.  This is 
the stage of the herd (Nietzsche, 1995, I).   
Nietzsche references simpler societies to level a charge at contemporary 
society; he writes that once (under Durkheim’s repressive laws) the ultimate 
punishment was exile.  Exile was worse then death because humans were defined 
by their herd (or as Durkheim refers to them in The Division of Labor:  the 
horde13) so that forced solitude meant immediate death symbolically as well as 
eventual physical death due to individual’s dependence on society.  In this sense, 
the social nature of morality, duty, obligation, responsibility is a sublimated self-
interest on the part of herd members fearful of solitude (Nietzsche, 1974). 
                                                 
13 Durkheim was careful to clarify that by “horde” he meant a kind of ideal type as “actual” hordes 
do not exist… I imagine Nietzsche would half-agree:  nothing “actual” exists as we create 
everything but there is still a herd.  Perhaps if Nietzsche had followed Durkheim instead of the 
other way around, he would have called the herd a “social fact.” 
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The camel, however, if it is ever to become a lion, must embrace solitude:  
“the spirit becomes a lion who would conquer his freedom and be master in his 
own desert” (Nietzsche, 1995, I).  Durkheim argues that social order and control 
are needed because humans will always want increasingly more beyond hope of 
satiation; in other words, humans cannot be freed from an external authority 
setting limits on them without becoming slaves to their own desires.  Durkheim 
writes, “No living being can be happy, or even exist, unless his needs are 
adequately related to his means.  In other words, if his needs require more than 
can be allocated to them, or even merely something of a different sort, they will 
be under continual friction and can only function painfully” (Giddens, 1998, 
174).  These needs are not material needs, as Durkheim argues, the material 
needs such as food are easily met.  Humans “need” levels of comfort and luxury 
that have continual risen in level throughout history.  These immaterial needs 
will increase unabated without society’s restrictions on them.  Class and status 
place these limits on individual humans by providing the available services in 
larger degree to some than others.  These external restriction thus force those 
without the means to procure the same services and goods as others to define 
their happiness in other terms.  This is the need for social control for, “[i]t is not 
human nature which can assign the variable limit necessary to our needs.  These 
are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone.  Irrespective of 
any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and 
bottomless abyss” (Ibid., 175). 
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This “insatiable” quality of human “nature” is “true,” according to 
Nietzsche, only for the camel.  In solitude, the lion learns to “conquer his 
freedom” and thus be his own master.  The lion is irreverent, destructive and 
wild.  In order for the “metamorphoses” to be complete, however, the lion must 
destroy his previous master and god.  Nietzsche describes this in terms of an epic 
battle: 
Who is the great dragon whom the spirit will no longer call 
lord and god?  “Thou shalt” is the name of the great dragon.  But 
the spirit of the lion says, “I will.”  “Thou shalt” lies in his way, 
sparkling like gold, an animal covered with scales; and on every 
scale shines a golden “thou shalt.”  Values, thousands of years old, 
shine on these scales; and thus speaks the mightiest of all dragons:  
“All value of all things shines on me.  All value has long been 
created, and I am all created value.  Verily, there shall be no more 
‘I will.’”  Thus speaks the dragon (Ibid.). 
 
Nietzsche did not write who will win as that is to be determined by each lion 
individually and cannot be written down.  The dragon is the force of the 
collective; it is the morality of the lambs.  The lion is a beast of prey and as 
discussed previously14 lambs would have the beasts of prey give up their evil 
ways, join the flock and be good little lambs.  It is this covert and ironic 
domination of lambs with their “good and evil” and subsequent “Thou shalt” that 
has convinced humanity that slavery is freedom. 
Nietzsche’s “blonde beast of prey” is something other but not in the sense 
of Baudrillard.  The lion does not want to be different in order to be like 
everyone else; it is different and yet still has a “self.”  The self is not destructed 
                                                 
14 In Chapter I 
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by the lack of a socially constructed understood label but freed from it, the self is 
allowed to become itself.  For this to occur, however, the spirit of the camel is 
destroyed in an act of suicide.  Nietzsche wrote in The Gay Science:  “What is 
life?  …continually shedding something that wants to die.  …being cruel and 
inexorable against everything about us that is growing old and weak….  …And 
yet old Moses said:  ‘Thou shalt not kill’” (26).  The duality between creation 
and destruction break down (as do all15 dualities from Nietzsche’s perspective) 
because the destruction of the camel is the simultaneous creation of the lion (in 
other words:  to create the Venus de Milo is to destroy a block of marble; to 
destroy a building is to create a pile of rubble—our distinction between 
destruction and creation can be useful but, according to Nietzsche, we must not 
forget it is an error).   
Durkheim, in many places in his writings, also takes up the issues 
Nietzsche and Baudrillard raise about society and self-destruction.  In an essay 
entitled, “The Dualism of Human Nature” (1914), Durkheim argues that, 
Society has its own nature, and consequently, its 
requirements are quite different from those of our nature as 
individuals: the interests of the whole are not necessarily those of 
the part. Therefore, society cannot be formed or maintained 
without our being required to make perpetual and costly sacrifices. 
Because society surpasses us, it obliges us to surpass ourselves; 
and to surpass itself, a being must, to some degree, depart from its 
nature-a departure that does not take place without causing more or 
less painful tensions.  (Found at:  
http://www.mdx.ac.uk/www/study/xdur.htm) 
 
                                                 
15 yes all, even the division between higher and lower types:  they are constructions, illusions that 
break down from the complexities their artificiality cannot “capture.” 
 64
Oftentimes, sociologists level the charges against someone, “he/she cannot see 
the forest for the trees,” sociologists tend to forget that there are trees too though 
and only see the forest or they see groups of oak or cedar in the forest and then 
think they see trees.  We are both social animals and individuals but in order to 
exist we must give our social side dominant expression.  As such, life requires us 
to kill the individual in us in order to become more than ourselves.  “Thou shalt” 
must be reified with sacrifice for the good of the whole.  According to Durkheim, 
we are obliged to live with that uneasy feeling that we as individuals could be 
“more” because to indulge that feeling would lead to physical suicide.  The 
sacrifice is not without its rewards though, through the reification of the 
collective consciousness we do become more than ourselves.  The very formation 
of society makes us, in a way, transcendent beings through a kind of unio mystica 
with all of society.  A. Cuvillier, in his preface to Durkheim’s Pragmatism and 
Sociology (1983), argues against the perspective that can be summed up as 
“Durkheim makes the collective consciousness into a kind of god” that I just 
invoked and contends this argument is a fallacy based on directionality (XVI).  
Durkheim put the universal into the collective consciousness not the collective 
consciousness into the universal.  I argue that Cuvillier misses the point; it is not 
the level of influence the collective consciousness wields over the universe 
(which is, however, total, as I will argue below) that makes it a god but the level 
of influence it wields over the individual that does. 
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Nietzsche seems to have presupposed Durkheim’s argument and throws 
his lot in with the lion: 
The super-animal.  The beast in us wants to be lied to; 
morality is a white lie, to keep it from tearing us apart. Without the 
errors inherent in the postulates of morality, man would have 
remained an animal. But as it is he has taken himself to be 
something higher and has imposed stricter laws upon himself. He 
therefore has a hatred of those stages of man that remain closer to 
the animal state, which explains why the slave used to be disdained 
as a nonhuman, a thing (Nietzsche, 1996, 40). 
 
Nietzsche often plays with the concepts of “higher” and “lower” and “higher” 
and “deeper” in interesting ways.  The blonde beasts of prey are “higher” than 
the “lowly” camels because they dive “deeper” into their own depths whereas the 
“higher” types embodied by the ascetic priests are less than the lions because 
they will themselves to soar “higher” into their ressentiment in order to be able to 
look down upon others.  Think of the difference between deeper and higher in 
terms of Nietzsche’s “subterranean man” and Dostoevsky’s “underground man”:  
the subterranean man forsakes others to courageously dive into his own depths to 
seek understanding to find “humanness” as well as to deconstruct and undermine 
old truths; the underground man, however, is cowardly and craven, he goes 
underground to hide from others and nurse his resentment that he is not 
recognized for his innate “power,” that he is not exalted for being “higher” than 
all others.   
In the above quote, Nietzsche is, tongue-in-cheek, equating the 
“highness” of humanity with the same kind of “highness” of the underground 
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man16 because he refers to people operating under morality and law as slaves, 
thus closer to the “animal state.”  He is saying the “true” function of morality and 
laws are to restrict the power and will of the individual to maintain the safety and 
unity of the collective.  In this light, the title of the aphorism can be taken in two 
very different ways; on the one hand, “the super-animal” is making fun of 
humanity for thinking itself so much greater than all other animals; on the other it 
is pointing out, with much optimism, what Nietzsche sees as the human potential. 
The lion is a destructive force; if it were to kill the dragon it would be 
unable to create any new truths or values for itself.  In this sense, the blonde 
beast of prey is spirit of nihilism.  It is also akin to many of the ideas propounded 
by some postmodernists such as Baudrillard:  it deconstructs and leaves the 
pieces scattered without rebuilding anything.  In the sense of the dichotomy 
between creation and destruction, the lion destroys merely for the sake of 
destruction; it has no meaning other than its own freedom and its freedom is like 
the rubble of a destroyed building, which is still a high goal but there are deeper 
depths humans can still reach.  There is one more stage in Nietzsche’s 
metamorphoses of spirit I have yet to cover:  the playful child.  Lions prepare the 
way for the playful child.  As Nietzsche writes of this preparation, which is worth 
quoting at length: 
I welcome all signs that a more virile, warlike age is about 
to begin, which will restore honor to courage above all.  For this 
age shall prepare the way for one yet higher, and it shall gather 
strength that this higher age will require some day—the age that 
                                                 
16 Nietzsche referred to Dostoevsky as the greatest psychologist. 
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will carry heroism into the search for knowledge and that will 
wage wars for the sake of ideas and their consequences.  To this 
end we now need many preparatory courageous human beings who 
cannot very well leap out of nothing, any more than out of the sand 
and slime of present-day civilization and metropolitanism—human 
beings who know how to be silent, lonely, resolute, and content 
and constant in invisible activities; human beings who are bent on 
seeking in all things for what in them must be overcome; human 
beings distinguished as much by cheerfulness, patience, 
unpretentiousness, and contempt for all great vanities as by 
magnanimity in victory and forbearance regarding the small 
vanities of the vanquished… (Nietzsche, 1974, 283). 
 
The “immoralist” Nietzsche has a moral code only by another name; the higher 
type of lion brings honor, dignity, nobility and, the thing we desperately need, 
authenticity not to society but to life.  Durkheim’s essential for humanity was 
society while Nietzsche’s was authentic life.   
Once the way is cleared, the playful child will place the last nail in the 
coffin of society.  Once humanity has learned to control their own freedom they 
will have no need for society as it is known today.  Durkheim’s formulations are 
necessary now because humanity is still a herd; it is still made up of camels 
waiting to be led with no ability to formulate an “I will.”   
But say, my brothers, what can the child do that even the 
lion could not do?  Why must the preying lion still become a child?  
The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a 
self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred “Yes.”  For the 
game of creation, my brothers, a sacred “Yes” is needed:  the spirit 
now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now 
conquers his own world (Nietzsche, 1995, 11). 
 
The playful child is the “Overman;” those of this type will be playful conquerors 
of a sort not in the sense of military conquest but of perspectival conquest.  They 
will be able to play with ideas and say yes to all perspectives and through them 
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create something new.  Humanity, when it is ready, will become truly the 
creators of their own world.  Now we play and create in digital realms but these 
are merely distractions from the world we could create in Nietzsche’s view.   
The Overman is a romantic concept by which it is easy to be trapped; we 
cannot try to turn from the slavery of Gesellschaft to be enslaved by pretty 
projections of the future.  These categories are valuations and as Nietzsche 
deconstructs valuations he does not save his own ideas from his noose.  He 
argued people become what they are (Nietzsche, 1989, EH, II: 9).  People are 
social construction they cannot “spring out of nowhere” and as such there is a 
strong element of determinism to who you are (Nietzsche wrote in the Gay 
Science it was a fundamental mistake to think that will is free (110)); however, 
determinism and agency are not mutually exclusive and embracing who you are 
and then moving on from there.  Having the courage to see yourself, to dive into 
your depths, is the most difficult exercise in agency.  Once humanity is 
recovered, possibilities of freedom open.  As Durkheim wrote of Nietzsche: 
In his [Nietzsche’s] view, logical or moral norms are a 
lesser concern.  His aim is to free completely both conduct and 
thought.  Speculative truth cannot be either impersonal or 
universal.  We can only know things by means of processes which 
distort them and, to a greater or lesser degree, transform them into 
our own thoughts.  We build them in our own likeness:  we give 
them a location in space, we assign them to genera and species, 
and so forth.  But none of this exists, not even the link of cause and 
effect.  We replace reality with a whole system of symbols and 
fictions, in a word, of illusions… (Durkheim, 1983, 3). 
 
If some individuals in Gesellschaft could learn to be playful and creative and 
then remain resilient in those qualities, some of us may be able to operate around 
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the authority of Gesellschaft to create a niche, not of Overmen—that word is too 
big, but of people striving to figure out what it means to be authenticately alive. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMMUNITIES 
In the previous two chapters, I have discussed many of the problems of 
organic society and I have also expressed hope that there could be a way to 
authenticate individual life.  This cannot be done in an anomic fashion and reject 
the collective wholesale for as Durkheim wrote in Suicide (1979): 
If... as has often been said, man is double, that is because 
social man superimposes himself upon physical man. Social man 
necessarily presupposes a society which he expresses and serves. If 
this dissolves, if we no longer feel it in existence and action about 
and above us, whatever is social in us is deprived of all objective 
foundation.  All that remains is an artificial combination of illusory 
images, a phantasmagoria vanishing at the least reflection; that is, 
nothing which can be a goal for our action.  Yet this social is the 
essence of civilized man... Thus we are bereft of reasons for 
existence; for the only life to which we could cling no longer 
corresponds to anything actual; the only existence still based upon 
reality no longer meets our needs (213).  
 
I argue there are other possibilities.  We are capable of creating something new 
from which to act.  I propose a new kind of community within organic society.  
Not one attempting to hearken back to some nostalgic fiction of the past but a 
playful new possibility.  With this in mind, I discuss Tönnies, Durkheim and 
Nietzsche’s concepts of communities before the shift to Gesellschaft.  I then look 
at three models of communities existing already within contemporary society and 
discuss why these models are insufficient for creating authentic, which includes a 
sense of endurance, human bonds.  Finally I propose, from the ideas of Tönnies 
and Nietzsche, a possible model for communities that might provide lasting 
communal solidarity as well as individual freedom. 
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Tönnies idealizes Gemeinschaft as the best option for humans living 
together.  Whereas Gesellschaft is characterized by rational will, Gemeinschaft is 
characterized by natural will.  Natural will is a holistic thing in which humans are 
united fully with themselves as well as those around them: 
The sphere of natural will is, in my definition, the essence 
of all forces that a human being or a group of human beings 
embody and encompass, in so far as these forces represent a unity 
the ego of which brings all their outer and inner conditions and 
changes into relation with itself through its memory and 
conscience (Tönnies, 2002, 178). 
 
Natural will locates humans in a sphere of possessions.  All possessions are 
produced in common with one another and held in common.  The community 
also has a sense of belongingness where each member feels connected to and a 
part of every other member.  Gemeinschaft has a form of authority, Tönnies 
contends, but it is one where the ones who rule are severely limited by the bonds 
with the ruled.  They not only will not but cannot overstep their strictly defined 
bounds of power as there is no model for such “power-grabbing.”  So, for 
Tönnies, Gemeinschaft is a social situation where people live in an inclusive, 
accepting environment with “natural” and intimate bonds of love for one another 
(Tönnies, 2002). 
Another aspect of Gemeinschaft that is important to this discussion is the 
element of freedom Gemeinschaft creates while still allowing expression of the 
social nature of humans.  Tönnies see there being a common will in 
Gemeinschaft but, unlike Gesellschaft, that will is not authoritative or 
oppressive; it has no need to be for Gemeinschaft is not made up of others but 
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fellows.  This difference in social context allows a great deal of agency to 
emerge:  “besides the inherited forces and instincts, the influence of a community 
as an educating and guiding will is the most important factor determining the 
condition and formation of every individual habit and disposition.  Especially is 
the family spirit important, but so also is every spirit which is similar to it and 
has the same effects” (ibid., 47).  This is an important distinction; the community 
is a collective will but one that does not dominate the individual’s.  The will of 
Gemeinschaft is a benevolent teacher and guide.  As has been stated in previous 
chapters, Tönnies concept of Gemeinschaft is a rosy ideal but it could not exist in 
this form under the rubric of such a dominant force as Gesellschaft.  As a model, 
however, Gemeinschaft offers many aspects that would be important to forming 
a community under Gesellschaft of individuals living in a non-alienated and non-
anomic fashion (at least in regards to the community members). 
Durkheim has a different perspective of traditional societies in which 
people remain together out of strong similarities and a powerful collective 
conscious.  These mechanical societies are homogenous and maintain cohesion 
through religion and strictly repressive laws.  Durkheim’s view does not paint the 
rosy picture of community life Tönnies’ does.  Mechanical societies are not a 
“natural” form of humanity just as chimpanzees are not humans; they are a step 
in the evolutionary path we took.  In this way, mechanical societies fit Tönnies’ 
reference to Hobbes better than Gesellschaft does—that life in this “state of 
nature” is “cruel, brutish and short” (Durkheim, 1997; Giddens, 1998).   
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Mechanical solidarity is more a solidarity by necessity and force rather 
than by interdependence and restitution.  Durkheim adds that those who idealize 
these traditional societies because they think they are without the division of 
labor make a presumptuous error.  The division of labor is still present in 
mechanical societies and in many ways it is stricter than in organic society 
because it is based upon something perceived to be biological:  gender.  In 
organic societies, people are at least allowed some modicum of freedom in the 
decision of where to specialize; for members of mechanical societies, their lives 
were fairly much determined at birth by the collective consciousness (ibid.).  As 
the kind of homogenization Durkheim argued existed in mechanical societies 
could not exist in organic societies that does not directly further my goal of 
community construction in Gesellschaft; however, he does point out the 
importance of strong cohesion in such small groups.  Also the need for a 
collective consciousness that is recognized and respected by the individual 
members is important is the community is to have any enduring quality. 
Nietzsche also romanticizes the past but in a very different way than 
Tönnies.  For him, the time before the slave revolt was one of nobility and 
freedom for higher types but it was also the time before humanity developed any 
depth.  Nietzsche argues that there were things before the slave revolt that are 
missing now such as communal life based upon nobility of spirit and the power 
of individuals: 
The man who has the power to requite goodness with 
goodness, evil with evil, and really does practice requital by being 
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grateful and vengeful, is called "good." The man who is 
unpowerful and cannot requite is taken for bad. As a good man, 
one belongs to the "good," a community that has a communal 
feeling, because all the individuals are entwined together by their 
feeling for requital. As a bad man, one belongs to the "bad," to a 
mass of abject, powerless men who have no communal feeling. 
The good men are a caste; the bad men are a multitude, like 
particles of dust. Good and bad are for a time equivalent to noble 
and base, master and slave. Conversely, one does not regard the 
enemy as evil: he can requite. In Homer, both the Trojan and the 
Greek are good. Not the man who inflicts harm on us, but the man 
who is contemptible, is bad. In the community of the good, 
goodness is hereditary; it is impossible for a bad man to grow out 
of such good soil. Should one of the good men nevertheless do 
something unworthy of good men, one resorts to excuses; one 
blames God, for example, saying that he struck the good man with 
blindness and madness (Nietzsche, 1996, 45). 
 
Nietzsche agrees there was strong communal cohesion before the slave revolt 
with a strict moral code.  He argues, however, that this moral code is more 
human than that of the “contemptible” person whose morality now dominates.  
There is an implication in the above quote that it is not possible for a community 
to exist among people who hold to such a morality as the contemptible ones do 
because communal existence takes a force of will on the part of each member 
that cannot be expressed by “bad” people. 
The slave revolt, however, added depth to humanity.  In On the 
Genealogy of Morals (1989), Nietzsche argued that people once had no sense of 
symbols.  A person who was said to be “pure” was one who bathed and that was 
all.  Depth of symbols developed gradually, but with the slave revolt, the depths 
grew tremendously.  Now people can have a visceral reaction to a piece of music 
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or a painting because the symbols and meanings run so deep within us.  
Nietzsche wrote that, above all, the slave revolt made humans more interesting. 
If Nietzsche’s view of humanity is taken “seriously” then the above 
discussion adds to possible communities in Gesellschaft the factor of who the 
members are.  They must have a sense of dignity that is without resentment.  The 
implication here is that communities under Gesellschaft cannot be formed as a 
reaction to Gesellschaft; they must be emergent from the individuals for the sake 
of the community itself.  If a community is formed as a reaction to society, then 
it is formed out of a sick will to power eaten with resentment toward 
Gesellschaft.  Moreover, members must believe one another.  Sincerity and trust 
must be taken for granted in such a community because otherwise there would 
exist a political element that would quickly decay into warring wills to power 
within the community.  So the inauthenticity Baudrillard and Tönnies see in 
contemporary society must, at the very least, be overcome within the context of 
the community in order for it to exist. 
Again, Tönnies and Durkheim are evaluating communities as organic and 
mechanical in different ways according to their focus.  I argue traditional 
communities were both organic and mechanical.  They may have had strong 
intimate ties with one another and felt an emotional familial bond with one 
another based on trust and acceptance (Durkheim does not disallow this in his 
analysis of Australian tribes in Elementary Forms of Religious Life) and in that 
respects had a more “open” collective consciousness while also maintaining 
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solidarity through the external force of repressive laws (Tönnies does not 
disallow this in his analysis of authority in Gemeinschaft).  Nietzsche sees 
communities before the slave revolt in such a way that combines aspects of 
Tönnies and Durkheim.  Communities are based on trust and acceptance while 
simultaneously having strict moral codes that help provide social cohesion (the 
code being a sense of honor and dignity).  Each sees a different aspect of 
community as being more important than the others focus though and, as such, 
both help to perceive a more rounded view of communities.  From this 
description of traditional societies, I move more directly into my focus:  the 
possibility of communities existing in organic society and what those 
communities entail.  
According to Tönnies and Durkheim, communities are being destroyed 
by or assimilated into contemporary society.  For Tönnies, Gemeinschaft is 
quickly disappearing as Gesellschaft expands looking for new markets and new 
land.  Gemeinschaft has no way of protecting itself against the power of 
Gesellschaft thus where conflict has occurred, Gemeinschaft is always destroyed 
eventually.  For Durkheim, mechanical societies represent segments of society 
and are assimilated into the larger organism as it evolves in a “natural” 
progression.  
Both theorists allow that some form of communities survives this 
assimilation but neither goes into depth on the topic as it seems a side note to 
their overall discussions.  Tönnies points out that such remnants may provide the 
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basis for a return to a more humane communal life if Gesellschaft were to recede 
whereas Durkheim sees them as being leftovers with no reason to be excised or 
assimilated if they are not harming the overall organism (like wisdom teeth).  But 
Durkheim also states that to hope for a return to communal life at some later 
point in time is naïve at best since the communal models that do still exist are 
mere renditions of their former selves and a resurgence of such structures would 
be artificial.  Durkheim asserts in a footnote that it is worth noting such 
communities within organic society do have collective consciousnesses intact:  
“In order to simplify our exposition we assume that the individual belongs to 
only one society.  In fact we form a part of several groups and there exists in us 
several collective consciousnesses; but this complication does not in any way 
change the relationship we are establishing” (Durkheim, 1997, 67 fn 44).  I argue 
that this point does complicate the relationship, however, as the existence of 
multiple collective consciousnesses in organic society allows for alternatives to 
an anomic individualizing over-consciousness where people may be able to find 
communal freedom in connection with one another. 
Tönnies also argues many groups under Gesellschaft have their own 
consciousnesses.  Tönnies discusses “artificial individuals” (75; 78); for him, 
these are mainly businesses that coalesce so as to have a competitive advantage 
over others.  He describes them as being Gemeinschaft-like but simultaneously 
not-Gemeinschaft as they have their own internal competition and they reason for 
creating such a “community” is to exploit others.  Communities cannot exist as a 
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means to an end but must be created as ends in and of themselves.  Nietzsche 
offers a view of a fledgling community within larger society in the final part of 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1995).  Zarathustra brings together many “higher men” 
for a Dionysian festival.  These people were said to have celebrated their mutual 
“convalescence” from the sickness of the herd.  As I wrote, though, it was a 
fledgling community and one cannot be certain that first night was meant to 
represent the celebration as such or as the start of a new model of social living 
other than the herd.  Nietzsche’s description of the celebration, however, 
highlights the importance of the pedagogical aspect in such a community as 
Zarathustra instructed the higher types in how to embrace their freedom. 
I argue there are many examples of communities in contemporary society 
but these tend to express a high degree of artificiality and anomie.  I will discuss 
three such communities and the reasons I think they do not work as models for 
“authentic” communities from Tönnies and Nietzsche’s perspectives.  As stated 
above, Tönnies argues corporations are artificial connections between people and 
he does not call them communities but the argument can be made as he does call 
corporations “artificial” individuals and wrote they are “Gemeinschaft-like” (75); 
he also discusses the existence of labor unions and how these are ineffectual and 
artificial; lastly I propose a smokers’ community as another example of an 
artificial connection of people under Gesellschaft. 
Take as an example, workers in bars.  Bar workers have their own niche 
in the economic structure that separates them from other service industry workers 
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and thus creates a kind of in-group/out-group dynamic that one could argue is 
indicative of a community.  Moreover, bars tend to be locally owned and thus the 
large bureaucratic infrastructure of franchised businesses if missing.  However, 
the collective consciousnesses of these bars is an artificial one in the sense that 
collective consciousness is something that is emergent from a group of people 
through their everyday interactions and acts as a kind of group identity that is 
different than the individual identities making it up but if people are selected for 
their homogenized identities by a master designer (hiring manager or bar owner) 
in an attempt to “create a certain atmosphere,” the collective consciousness is no 
different from each of its individual parts.  It is a simulacra collective identity 
because it is a copy but the originals cannot be said to be each individuals within 
the group.  For example, if a man has a genetic clone of himself created and he 
and his partner call the child “son,” the child would be a simulacra son.  
Furthermore, the separate bars’ identities are engaged in an artificial role-playing 
that patrons “go along with” much as an actor is engaged in artificial roles that 
audiences suspend disbelief in order to enjoy.  The difference between the actor 
and the collective identity of the bar is that patrons do not “suspend disbelief” in 
order to enjoy a bar.  I have often heard patrons refer to a sense of belonging 
when they go into a preferred bar.  This feeling of belongingness is that of the 
patron’s sense of “true self” being embedded into what the patron perceives to be 
the larger “true self” of the bar.  The bar’s perceived “self,” however, is 
perceived as authentic by deception and thus forces patrons’ selves into a 
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manipulative, inauthentic embeddedness—to force the patron to enter their 
perceived “true self” into a circulation of fictions (which then negates any sense 
of “trueness” about patrons’ selves) against their knowledge. 
The second example is that of labor unions.  These communities have had 
a great deal of victories aimed at lessening the alienation in the division of labor; 
however, as Tönnies wrote: 
In the labor market, workers can unite as sellers of labor 
and by excluding competition compel a higher price.  But as 
proprietor of all agencies in which labor is incorporated as a 
subordinate part, the manufacturing person remains, in a natural 
and logically determined way, creator and thus owner of all human 
work produced by outside human labor and sold on the market in 
order to retain this value (Tönnies, 2002, 99). 
 
Now if labors unions dissolve because they prove to be an ineffectual way to deal 
with corporations, then these communities existed only as a tool or artificial 
individual created to deal with another artificial individual.  Over the past few 
decades, labor unions have declined and have proven ineffectual over the 
dominant will of Gesellschaft.  Now it could be argued that this is not a good 
example because laws, violence and coercion within the communities were what 
led to their downfall; I deny none of this but labor unions still can be said to have 
been a teleological community, a means to an end, and not an end in and of itself.  
Therefore they do not provide a good communal example under organic society. 
There is another problematic model for communities under Gesellschaft:  
smokers.  Smoking is illustrative of Durkheim’s perceived dualism in humanity; 
it is, on the one hand, an individual addiction and self-expression and on the 
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other, it is a social behavior.  Smoking breaks down barriers such as class and 
status between people to an extent.  Take for example a teacher and student, if 
both happen to smoke and come upon one another outside there is a high chance 
that they will begin a conversation with one another that otherwise (without the 
smoking) would not have happened.  In an ironic way, smoking makes it 
probable that people will stop and “smell the roses” (assuming their olfactory 
sense still functions), look around them and take in things.  Smoking provides an 
excuse to slow down at different times throughout the day.  In part due to this 
aspect of the habit, smokers tend to congregate together and have discussions 
where, it seems, there is a positive correlation with the number of cigarettes 
smoked in a row and the depth of the conversation (could be the amount of time 
spent in discussion, could be the nicotine…).  Smoking allows strangers to meet 
based merely on the shared characteristic of being smokers.  Often if two 
smokers who do not know each other walk out a building at the same time to 
have a cigarette, they will talk with one another and open up a human connection 
that was not there before.  Empathy is also an aspect of smokers’ community. 
As a smoker, there is a moral obligation to give cigarettes to fellow 
smokers who are out of supplies.  This is provided that in so doing, you do not 
end up going without cigarettes yourself (thus the empathy is not selfless 
altruism as the individual with supplies still comes first).  Though there are 
positive aspects to such a community, there is no strong sense of solidarity.  
Smokers do not organize or have a collective consciousness (if they did they 
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would be able to act against the onslaught of laws banning smoking in some 
many public places).  The connections made between smokers who share 
cigarettes are not usually intimate and strong boundaries remain in place between 
individual smokers.  These aspects make the smokers’ community an example of 
community in organic societies but their example does not provide a model for a 
community based upon authentic human connection. 
In Foucault’s essay, “Useless to Revolt,” he discusses the reasons people 
take the risk of losing their lives for ideas.  Foucault wrote, “The impulse by 
which a single individual, a group, a minority, or an entire people says, ‘I will no 
longer obey,’ and throws the risk of their life in the face of an authority they 
consider unjust seems to me to be something irreducible (Foucault, 1994, 449).  
The form of communities I propose here would be a kind of revolt against the 
dehumanizing aspects of Gesellschaft discussed in chapter I.  But it is important 
that the existence of these communities not be understood as rebellions; more it 
is that to seek deep bonds with fellows in concert with those fellows as well as a 
sense of authenticity in life is to attempt to throw off the authority of an advanced 
organic collective consciousness.  The revolt I am discussing is not a physically 
violent one but a spiritually violent attempt to reclaim the ability to define 
humanity according to different standards.  As I asserted above, these 
communities cannot exist if they are for the sake of rebellion; they must exist as 
ends.  Otherwise they are merely a group expression of resentment and thus no 
different from an impotent slave revolt. 
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There are aspects of mechanical society and Gemeinschaft that remain as 
artifacts, much like museum pieces, in contemporary society.  These aspects can 
provide a partial template, a fragmented set of perspectives, from which we may 
be able to playfully create a new model for living in connection with fellows.  
Some things we cannot recreate, such as the homogeneity of mechanical societies 
but we cannot “re” create anyway if what we are attempting to make is to be 
entirely new.   
If a community within Gesellschaft is to survive past its inception it must 
have a strong collective consciousness.  The collective consciousness can be 
created, however, by the other things such a community would need—a strong 
sense of friendship and a familial-like passage of knowledge and experiences 
through the generations of members.  These aspects could provide solidarity 
within a community as well as allow for the expression of an authentic 
individuality and freedom even under the rule of Gesellschaft.  
Nietzsche provided an hierarchy of moral sentiments in Human, All Too 
Human (1996) that leads into a discussion of friendship as a mutual exploration 
of depths.  He argues the first step is looking to the future (providing for future 
needs in the present); the next step is a principle of honor that would tie people to 
one another in a rigid (one might say mechanical) manner, then there is a 
personal morality that can emerge where individuals are capable of “hanging 
their own laws above their heads” and provides solidarity on the basis of mutual 
respect.  Nietzsche then concludes that such a person, “lives and acts as a 
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collective-individual” (94).  This is an important step towards creating a 
community under Gesellschaft where people can be closely tied with one another 
while simultaneously embracing their own freedom as individuals. 
Another aspect of this collective-individual is self-knowledge.  
Friendships that are to be based on deep intimate bonds can only work if the 
friends can dive into their own depths first.  As Nietzsche wrote in Daybreak 
(2001), “They were friends but have ceased to be, and they both severed their 
friendship at the same time:  the one because he thought himself too much 
misunderstood, the other because he thought himself understood too well—and 
both were deceiving themselves!—for neither understood himself well enough” 
(287).  So to attempt such a community as I am proposing without a strong self-
understanding would be a futile venture—the community may begin but it would 
eventually dissolve.  Nietzsche claims that, for the Greeks, the word for relative 
was also the word for the concept of “best friend” (Nietzsche, 1996, 354).  This 
is important to keep in mind because in this sense of community, the 
relationships formed would necessarily transcend such concepts as “friend” and 
even “family.”  But “family” is probably closer to what I am trying to convey. 
The last point I am going to make about friendship is the importance of 
respecting fellow collective-individuals as ends themselves and not possessions.  
Nietzsche again, in The Gay Science (1974), helps make this point, “Here and 
there on earth we may encounter a kind of continuation of love in which this 
possessive craving of two people for each other gives way to a new desire and 
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lust for possession—a shared higher thirst for an ideal above them.  But who 
knows such love?  Who has experienced it?  Its right name is friendship [italics 
in original]” (14).  Fellows in this sense of community cannot view others with 
this sense of possession for the simple reason that the concept of personal 
possession ends in anger, jealousy and dissolution.  One important point of 
contention that bears mention here is Nietzsche’s split with his teacher Arthur 
Schopenhauer on the issue of compassion.   
The model of community I propose here is heavily dependent upon a 
Nietzschean analysis of social relations.  These relations do not depend upon 
compassion as Nietzsche saw compassion as fostering weakness in the receiver 
as well as turning the giver into a kind of master over the receiver.  
Schopenhauer (1882) saw compassion is love and the wellspring of all morality; 
thus compassion is the very basis of human cohesion.  Once again, the division is 
one of value.  Nietzsche did not want cohesion based on compassion as he saw it 
morally degrading to the power of the individual.  This, however, does not mean 
cohesion cannot exist but that it must exist upon a different foundation.  
Friendship offers such a foundation.  For Nietzsche, friend and enemy were not 
opposite but are oftentimes so similar as to deny distinction.  Friend and enemy 
alike, in this sense, push individuals to be stronger and more powerful, refusing 
to coddle the expression of weakness that would demand compassion between 
friends.  According to Nietzsche, friendship cannot exist on a basis of 
compassion as it would merely be (assuming compassion is given and taken on 
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both sides) a constant flipping of the roles master/slave where one is always 
dominant over another, never an equal. 
Aspects of this idea of communal friendship exist even in the simulacra 
communities that exist in organic society.  Service industry jobs such as bar work 
and restaurant workers allow for a more open human connection than other 
examples for inauthentic communities in the sense that there is not a 
preponderance of rational will.  A more natural will can be said to permeate these 
service industry workers as they will not force one another to remain attached to 
the codified collective consciousness of the business’ rules.  Minors who are in 
this industry are allowed to consume alcoholic beverages and food intended for 
customers’ uses is consumed and shared by fellow workers.  In this sense, there 
are noticeable remnants of Gemeinschaft that operate under Gesellschaft; they 
are, however, becoming fewer and fewer as the dominance of rational will 
becomes more pervasive (such as the ubiquity of cameras).  
Tönnies and Nietzsche place a strong importance on pedagogical pursuits 
among people and for the construction of a community of individuals within 
organic society, such a focus on passing on knowledge and learned experience 
through members would be critical for maintaining strong communal cohesion.  
The pedagogy of the kind of community I am proposing is based upon that of 
Gemeinschaft and is intimately tied to the concept of friendship: 
In so far as enjoyment and labor are differentiated 
according to the very nature and capabilities of individuals—
especially in such a manner that one part is entitled to guidance, 
the other bound to obedience—the constitutes a natural law as an 
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order of group life, which assigns a sphere and function, 
incorporating duties and privileges, to every will.  Understanding 
is based upon intimate knowledge of each other in so far as this is 
conditioned and advanced by direct interest of one being in the life 
of the other, and readiness to take part in his joy and sorrow 
(Tönnies, 2002, 47). 
 
So in order for such a community to exist and maintain itself, the individuals of 
the group would need to will it.  It would be easy to fall back to the safety net of 
Gesellschaft and creating a non-alienated, non-anomic community within 
Gesellschaft would not be an easy task.  Members would have to learn to have 
emotions again in order to care for one another.  There is a strong need not for 
knowledge of fellow for the sake of that knowledge but that members have that 
knowledge of each other because they are deeply invested and interested in the 
lives of each other.  This aspect of the pedagogy is much more important than the 
methods by which knowledge is transmitted.  Many different methods, as long as 
they are not alienating, would suffice so long as the importance of the intimacy is 
remembered and maintained. 
A possible example of the kind of community I have discussed here is the 
survivalists who gather together periodically and trust one another with their 
lives in the face of extreme environmental hazards.  I am not a member of one of 
these communities and only know of them through readings so I offer them as an 
example only tentatively.  The members of these can be said to at least be 
striving for authenticity as they momentarily reject the materiality and pretension 
of Gesellschaft momentarily to live a dangerous and challenging life.  These 
groups are self-selective as people will not join without a desire to shed the 
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shallow aspects of advanced social life for such a dangerous endeavor.  Much 
survivalist literature discusses the importance of believing in the people who 
accompany one another into these minimalist situations.  Thus there is a hardness 
to the inclusivity of the group where people will not be allowed to join if they are 
thought to be going on trips out of some romantic notion or simply to be able to 
say, “I did it!”  To allow such people to join these survivalist expeditions would 
be to invite danger to the community.   
There is also a pedagogical aspect to these groups.  People must learn 
how to survive outside the safety net of organic society from somewhere as much 
of the required knowledge is lost through societal living.  People must submit 
and follow the collective consciousness of the community in order to be able to 
later realize their freedom through the community.  Furthermore, one would be 
hard pressed to rely on someone else for survival and then not form close 
intimate bonds with fellows.  This is part of the reasoning of radical groups who 
send new recruits to survivalist camps to foster group cohesion (as well as to 
indoctrinate members with the groups religious-political propaganda).  The 
groups I am discussing are not of this type.  These radical groups are teleological; 
they exist as means to ends.  The groups I am discussing need no justification 
because they exist as ends themselves.  Pedagogy and intimate friendship go 
hand in hand as Nietzsche and Tönnies imagined in such groups thus allowing 
for the possible creation of individuality within a community and then the 
realization of freedom through the embracing of the community. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I am writing this section because the Thesis Office, in their thesis 
handbook, requires the last chapter of a thesis to be titled “conclusion.”  I, 
however, had every intention of ending my thesis with my analysis on 
communities but I did not want to label that chapter “conclusion;” I thought it 
better to label it “communities.”  The more I read the thesis handbook and the 
mountains of “handouts,” which are online and thus have nothing to do with being 
“handed” or “out” but more like eternally existing in the hyperereal, the more I 
realized that the thesis office provided me an excellent current example of my 
analysis in chapter I.  Therefore, my compromise with the Thesis Office is a short 
chapter titled “conclusion” in which I will briefly analyze the normalizing 
oppressive power “embodied” in the digitized “guide”lines of the Thesis Office 
Consciousness (TOC) as my conclusion. 
 There are several ways in which TOC embodies the same principles as 
Gesellschaft; its rule is final and absolute (graduate students are informed their 
theses can be rejected based on failure to comply with formatting rules) 
demonstrating their power over the powerless; its method of rule is precision of 
form to the exclusion of content (a degree is deferred based upon the precision 
with which a student sets margins to 1.25 or 1.4 inches not upon what is actually 
written); and it maintains this rule by injecting fear into its relatively powerless 
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subjects (I may not get my degree if my margins are not set “correctly” as its 
website makes abundantly clear). 
 TOC is an expression of a formal rational will that normalizes each 
individual students regardless of the student him/herself.  Regardless of the 
subject matter of the thesis, a student must declare his/her area of study in 
concordance with the records on file at TAMU and each must format his/her 
thesis in precisely the same way.  Now there may be a number of rational, logical 
reasons for this but my point is that this will of TOC is ultimately an expression of 
power to which any rational, logical reasons for this “arbitrary” level of precision 
are subordinate.  In demonstration, one need only look at the number of 
formatting rules, ad absurdum ad nasseum, present at its website 
(http://thesis.tamu.edu/).  Students are artificially individualized in many ways; a 
vita must be added, it must be called “vita,” it must contain “the” student’s name 
(as it appears on every other page of the thesis), address and educational 
background, the student’s committee members must be listed on the second page 
(which must match the required coverpage with the only exception being the 
listed committee members), etc.  Yet all of these things must be done by all 
students thus creating merely a chimera of individuality.  Complacency is 
guaranteed by an internalized fear on the part of students who may be denied a 
degree until all formatting conforms with all TOC’s rules.  In this way, graduate 
students are normalized through the panoptic gaze of TOC formatting. 
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 One could go much further with this analysis but for me to do so would 
run the risk of repeating what has already been stated in chapter I of this thesis.  
TOC simply offers a present example of the pervasiveness of Gesellschaft values 
in our day-to-day lived experiences (I also cut this short because I have not yet 
finished all formatting and the internalized presence of the rational will of the 
clock is weighing heavily at this point in time). 
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